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f.1.1he research problem examined in my thesis is stated 
clearly in the title: Justice Brennan and The Bill of 
Rights. In my examination, I rslied primarily on Brennan's 
opinions, and secondarily, on scholarly commentaries au-
thored by Brennan and others. I located the cases through 
a combination of sources. Initially, I consulted the 
rrerm ( s)," which is published annually in its November edi-
tion, and then, I turned to the writings by, and aoout, 
Brennan. ~y findings show that Brennan's approach in these 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower in the midst of the 
1956 Presidential campaign telephoned Herbert Brownell, his 
Attorney General, and said, "J:ind me a Catholic real quick, 
t-1inton has retired." 1 Shortly thereat ter, William J. 
Brennan, Jr., a distinguished Associate Justice of the New 
Jersey Supreme court, was informed that he was President 
Eisenhower's choice to fill the seat on the United states 
Supreme Court vacated by the retirement of Associate Jus-
tice Sherman Minton. 2 His Congressional confirmation fol-
lowed immediately, and he took his oath of office on Octo-
ber 16, 1956. He was then at the age of fifty the youngest 
member of the court, and the first catholic appointment 
since the death of Frank ~1urphy in 1~4~. 
1
william o. Douglas, ~_butobiography of~il:,!i.am_Q~ 
DQuglas; The court ~~' 1939-1~75 (New York: Random 
House, 1980), p. 249. Given the impending election and the 
rising political star of John l'.. Kennedy, President Eisen-
hower was committed to getting "a young, lioeral, Catholic 
Democrat" for political reasons. 
2According to E'rancis P. McQuade and Alexander T. 
Kardos in "Mr. Justice Brennan and His Legal Philosophy," 
Notre Dame Lawy~, 33 (May, 1~58), p. 324, Brennan attrib-
uted his appointment in part to the probaole factors of 
"his interest in court reform and his advocacy of more en-
lightened trial procedures to avoid court congestion." 
2 
During his twenty-six years on the Court, Brennan has 
established himself as a judicial activist. He has es-
poused an expansive view of the court's role in interpret-
ing the constitution. The guiding light of his activism 
has been liberalism.3 Indeed, he was "the cutting edge of 
Warren Court liberalism. 11 4 In 1':;}80, Erank I. tvlichelman 
wrote in tribute: 
No Justice in history, save Thurgood Marshall 
has stood as bravely and eloquently as has william 
Brennan for a thoroughly democratic vision of 
social justice and political liberty, in which 
status and opportunity are positively not allowed 
to depend upon accident of oirth, background or 
economic fortune, nor upon conformity in matters 
of conscience, politics or association.~ 
while on the Court, Brennan's liberalism has evolved. 
During his formative years, his liberalism was best de-
scribed as pragmatic, but over the years, particularly 
since 1969, it has become increasingly more idealistic. 6 
3Webster's New collegiate piction,a~ {1975 ed.) de-
fines liberalism as "a political philosophy based on oelief 
in progress, the essential goodness of man, and the auton-
omy of the individual and standing for the protection of 
political and civil liberties." 
4Edward v. Heck, "Justice Brennan and the Heyday of 
Warren court Liberalism," Santa Clara i,.aw Review, 20 {Fall, 
1980) , p. 841. 
5:r·rank I. Michelman, "A Trioute to Justice william 
Brennan," Haryal:_O civil Righta-civil Liberties Law__Beview, 
15 (Fall, 1~80), p. 296. 
6~~~A. defines pragmatic as "relating to matters 
ot fact or practical affairs often to the exclusion of in-
tellectual or artistic matters: practical as opposed to 
idealistic." Conversely, it defines idealistic as "of or 
relating to the practice of forming ideals or living under 
their influence." 
3 
This evolution, however, is not complete. That is, while 
Brennan has moved toward an idealistic vision of liberal-
ism, he has not completely abandoned a pragmatic one. 
His Bill of Rights opinions-7 reflect his liberalism. 
In this area, he has revealed himself clearly as a civil 
libertarian by his preference for protecting the individ-
ual's liberties. ~otivated by either his desire tor demo-
cratic self-government, or his respect for personal privacy 
and human dignity, he has been a court leader in the ef-
forts to place an umbrella over the liberties of the indi-
vidual vis-a-vis government intrusions. In this quest, he 
oelieves that the court must take an active role. He de-
clared that the special role assigned to the Supreme court 
~ith respect to the Bill of Rights is to interpret it in 
such a way as to carry out the Eramers' determination to 
prevent governmental oppression of individual liberties.8 
He draws upon history and legal precedent9 as his primary 
7This is a paper about civil liberties, not civil 
rights. There is a difference between the two. civil 
rights are those rights of a citizen conferred by congress 
such as the civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1~65, and 1~68. 
Conversely, civil liberties are those liberties expressed 
in the Bill of Rights that guarantee the individual free-
dom trom arbitrary governmental interference. In other 
words, civil liberties are a negation of governmental 
power. 
8
william J. Brennan, "Constitutional Adjudication," 
Notre Dame Law~, 40 (August, 1~65), p. 559. 
'ae is not absolutely bound by precedent: nonethe-
less, he tended to respect it more than his libertarian, 
warren Court Brethen. 
tools in his attempt to carry out this special assigned 
role. 
4 
The evolution in Brennan's liberalism is evidenced in 
his evolving perception of civil liberty claims. Early on, 
he saw a great deal of "gray" in such claims, and used a 
balancing test to resolve them. His balance gave more em-
phasis to the individual's lioerty vis-a-vis the proposed 
governmental policy reasons :tor aoridging it. on the other 
hand, he employed an absolutist approach in cases in which 
the claim was presented in "black" and "white" terms. over 
the years, as his lioeralisrn has .oecome more idealistic, he 
expanded this black and white area, and consequently, he 
has relied increasingly more uf>On an absolutist approach. 
In short, my thesis is that Brennan has moved increasingly 
toward an absolutist approach in the area of the Bill of 
Rights, but as of yet, not to the total disregard ot bal-
ancing. 
~hat factors lie behind this evolution( Three prob-
able ones come to mind immediately. One, the change of 
guard between 1969 and 1975, from the libertarian warren 
court to the law-and-order Burger Court. compared to 
warren court libertarians like Hugo L. Black, William o. 
Douglas, Arthur J. Goldberg, and Abe Eortas, Brennan seemed 
moderate. Conversely, in relation to Burger Court law-
and-order stalwarts such as Chief Justice ~arren E. Burger, 
and Justices Lewis F'. Powell, William H. Rehnquist, Harry 
clackmun, and John ~aul Stevens, Brennan appears radical. 
In fact, many of his most vigorous and passionate liber-
tarian opinions in the past decade have been direct reac-
tions to the Burger court majority's law-and-order stance. 
Two, the breakdown of ethical consensus in contemporary 
America1-0 has had a marked influence upon Brennan's growing 
5 
tolerance of diversity in the areas of speech, .belief, and 
lifestyle. r'inally, the increasing absolutism, partly 
stimulated by this breakdown, in the scholarly studies 
Brennan has relied on. The effect of these studies is most 
obvious in his E'irst Amendment decisions. 
Edward v. Heck illuminates a fourth factor. He as-
serts that Brennan's evolution "may .be ••• more the result 
of experience than a fundamental shift in his approach in 
constitutional adjudication."11 According to him, Brennan's 
experience over the years has led to the diminishing of his 
confidence in the other governmental branches, as well as 
the lower courts, to give meaning to the supreme court de-
cisions. Consequently, his approach has become more aoso-
lute in order to restrict the discretionary oounds in which 
trial judges, juries, and state legislatures can work out 
the fundamental principles announced by the su~reme court. 
10
see G. Edward White, f.at~.1,_Qf Alllerican Legal 
~~ht (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1~78), pp. 167-172: and .1'.Q~ Law in f.merica.i,._-Ul Intellec-
tual Histor~ (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1~80), pp. 209-215. 
1 1 Heck, p. 876. 
CHAPTE.R II 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Justice Brennan's judicial product has not been for-
mulated in a vacuum, but rather within the particular his-
torical context encompassing his years on the court studied 
here, 1~56-1982. 1 The late 1950's witnessed the rapid de-
cline in P~erica's excessive cold War fear of internal corn-
munism and political radicalism. ~hile this fear receded 
into the background, liberalism moved to the forefront. 
Between 1960 and 1968, America experienced an unparalleled 
growth, in its history, of egalitarianism. 2 This growth, 
1My outline is a synthesis of my readings on this 
period. These readings include: Charles c. Alexander, 
HQ.!.ging the Li~ Th~i§enhower Era, ~52-19~ (Bloom-
ington & London: Indiana University Press, 1975); Carl M. 
Brauer, John F. Kennedy gnd the second Reconst~~ (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1977); John Lewis Gaddis, 
.l'.!!.ii ... J.l.ni:ted states and the origins of the cold war, 1941.:: 
~ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Jim F'. 
Heath, The Decade of Disi.1.l.Y.l.i.Qnme.nt: The Kennedy/Johwl2D 
~.._., (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 
1975); J. Joseph Huthmacher, ed., The Truman YearsJ...___Ib& 
Reconstruction of Postwar AJPeri~ (Hinsdale, Illinois: 
The Dryden Press, Inc., 1972); William Safire, ~gx§~ 
Fall: An .. IWlide View ot....the-f.a~a:tergate_wfil,te Hous.-
(Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1975); Milton 
Viorst, ;Eire in thJL.Streets: ameri~a in the 1960'1 (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1979); and Theodore H. white, 
Breach 2.f-l:aith: ~-EQll of Richard Nixon (New York: 
Atheneum Publishers, 1975). 
2.rt§~~.Ji defines egalitarianism as "a belief in hu-
man equality esp. with respect to social, political, and 
economic rights and privileges." 
however, waned in the late 1960's as frustration and dis-
illusionment set in, and since 1968, America has reacted 
by shifting toward conservatism. 3 The purpose of this 
chapter is to outline the historical context in which 
Brennan has served on the supreme Court. 
7 
The cold war, pitting the United states and its Demo-
cratic way of life against the soviet Union and its cornrnu-
nistic one, began even before the Second world war ended. 
One of its many initial consequences was the excessive 
fear of internal communism and political radicalism that 
swept America in the decade after 1945. This fear, in 
turn, generated an anti-communist crusade that was "com-
pounded of a moderate element of intelligent concern for 
public security ••• and a very large component of emotion-
alism, irrationalism, and downright hysteria. 114 Alfred A. 
Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison outline the crusade's funda-
mental premise: 
It held that the American communist Party, in 
cooperation with the Soviet Union, was engaged 
in a gigantic conspiracy to envelop the United 
states in a network of espionage, to penetrate 
3webst~.a defines conservatism as "a political phi-
losophy based on tradition and social stability, stressing 
established institutions, and preferring gradual develop-
ment to abrupt change: a disposition in politics to pre-
serve what is established." 
4Alfred A. Kelly and Winfred A· Harbison, the AID~= 
can constitu;tiQD.l Its_Qxigins and ~eve~~~ 5th Edi-
tion (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976), 
p. 826. 
the government and pervert and paralyze P.merican 
politics, and finally to destroy the American 
constitutional system in violent revolution.S 
The crusade led to the adoption of an assortment of secur-
ity and loyalty measures by the federal government and the 
states aimed at guarding against the dangers of an inter-
nal communist conspiracy. 
The "Red scare" reached its apex in the early 1950's 
with the NcCarthy era. In ~·ebruary 1950, Joseph Mccarthy, 
8 
an undistinguished junior Senator from Wisconsin, declared 
that he had a list of 256-known Communists in the state 
Department. Between 1951 and 1954, he conducted invest!-
gations and hearings, under the auspices of the senate, to 
ferret out these Communists. It came to an abrapt end, 
however, after McCarthy's disastrous encounter with the 
brillant attorney Joseph welch in the 1954 senate hearings 
on communism in the Army. In short, welch revealed McCar-
thyism for what it was: a circus built on a foundation of 
fabrication. overall, this unveiling did much to discredit 
America's excessive concern over Communist-controlled in-
filtration, subversion, and revolution. 
In the late 1950's, as many /l.mericans came to see 
its irrationality, the anti-communist crusade burned itself 
out. While it was burning out, a powerful new egalitarian 
drive, the product of a myriad of forces, began to domi-
nate the American way of life. The election of John F. 
Kennedy to the Presidency in 1960 marked its official be-
ginning, and the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
and Robert E. Kennedy in 1968 signalled its end. During 
these years, America's desire for egalitarianism was il-
lustrated in congress' enactment of four monumental pieces 
of legislation--the Civil Rights Act of 1964: the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964: the Voting Rights Act of 1965: 
and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. The Warren court, mean-
while, continued to play the leading role it had assumed 
in 1954 in J;U;2wn v.~.Q.a.l"d of Education_of To~, in real-
izing this desire. 
9 
During the 1960's, tens of thousands of Americans, 
many motivated by a desire for egalitarianism, took to the 
streets in protest. In the early part of the decade, their 
methods of protest, as mirrored in the freedom rides, the 
sit-ins, and the r.1artin Luther King led freedom marches, 
were ones of passive resistance or non-violent civil dis-
obedience. But after 1965, the Johnson Administration es-
calated the United states' military involvement in Vietnam. 
Many J\mericans became frustrated and disillusioned, for 
they saw this escalation as an abandonment of liberalism. 
Their outrage was reflected in the protest movement's in-
creasing use of violence. Indeed, the phrase "Fire in the 
Streets" aptly describes the historical period between 1965 
and 1971. As they witnessed the Administration's offering 
10 
of their crusade for equality as a sacrificial lamb, many 
Black civil rights activists grew impatient with King's 
tactic of non-violent resistance, and accepted the violent 
means advocated by the "Black Power" movement. The "white" 
protest movement, concentrated exclusively by then against 
u.s. military involvement in southeast Asia, likewise, be-
came increasingly militant, as exhibited outside Chicago's 
1968 Democratic National Convention. The protest movement 
and much of what it represented was defused by the rise of 
conservatism in the 1970's. 
As frustration and disillusionment with liberalism 
hardened during the late 1960's, a sentiment of conserva-
tism began to sweep the land. Indeed, since 1969, this 
sentiment has engulfed the American way of life. It was 
a major factor in the elections of Richard M. Nixon in 
1968 and 1972, and Ronald Reagan in 1980. Moreover, it 
is illustrated in the Warren Court's law-and-order inter-
pretation of the Bill of Rights. 
conservatism was so strong that it was able to with-
stand the shock of Nixon's "Imperial Presidency." During 
his years in the ~bite House, Nixon, under the guise of 
the executive prerogative power, did much to undermine the 
credibility and respectability of the Executive Office. 
In June 1971, The New York Til!l§.§ and the Jtgshington fost 
published the Daniel Ellsberg purloined Defense Depart-
ment 1 s "inside" account of U.S. military activities in 
11 
southeast Asia. Prior to the publication of the so-called 
"Pentagon Papers," a special White House espionage unit 
dubbed the ".Plumbers," in the name ot national security, 
illegally tried to recover them; for Nixon regarded the 
"Papers" as a source of embarrassment to his administra-
tion. ~hen these efforts failed, Nixon appealed to the 
courts in an unsuccessful attempt to suppress their publi-
cation. While his actions in this instance were question-
able, they arguably were impeachable in connection with the 
'Watergate crisis. In June 1972, agents of the Wh~te House, 
acting on direct orders, staged a break-in of the Democrat-
ic National committee's Washington, o.c. headquarters lo-
cated at the Watergate apartment complex. After it came to 
the public's attention in E'ebruary 1973, Nixon publicly 
prevaricated about his administration's involvement in the 
break-in and the subsequent coverup conspiracy. Later, he 
formally refused to comply with a court addressed subpoena 
ordering him to produce a series of tape recordings of his 
private conversations with the White House staff, covering 
the period from June 20 I 1972 to April 15 I 1973. r·inally I 
he resigned as President on August 9, 1974, to avoid im-
peachment by the congress for his complicity in the Water-
gate coverup. 
Justice Brennan's position with respect to the Bill 
of Rights has evolved within this historical context. An 
understanding of that context is critical, for his position 
12 
is partially a product thereof, at least, to the extent 
that the cases were shaped within that context and brought 
before the supreme Court for resolution. Moreover, Brennan 
revealed a consciousness of the context in a number of 
cases. A prime example of this is his dissenting opinion 
in Walker v._.city of Birmingham (1967). Therein, he wrote, 
"we cannot permit fears of 'riots' and 'civil disooedience' 
generated by slogans like 'Black Power' to divert our at-
tention ot 'What is here at stake. 116 In the next eight 
chapters, I intend to shed light on this evolution through 
an examination of Brennan's Bill of Rights opinions. 
6




FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
The further breakdown of ethical consensus in contem-
porary p.merica1 is an underlying factor in the evolution of 
Brennan's judicial product. This breakdown has led in-
creasingly toward a type of ethical relativism: what con-
stitutes "ethical" or "propriety" depends upon the respec-
tive individual's view of it. over the years, Brennan's 
decisions, partly fueled by this breakdown, have exhibited 
a growing toleration, indeed appreciation, for diversity in 
speech, belief, and lifestyle. In this chapter and subse-
quent ones, I intend to discuss its possible implications 
upon his r'irst Amendment opinions. 
The Eounding Fathers wrote the guarantee of religious 
f reedorn into the F'irst Mnendment' s Establishment and r ree 
hxercise Clause. Brennan views freedom of religion as one 
ot the most precious values in American society. He con-
tends that governmental involvement in the establishment 
of religion, and/or its curtailment of the free exercise 
thereof, must be strictly guarded against. He points out, 
1There is some scholarly debate over when the break-
down actually began, but one thing is certain, it con-
tinued during the 1960's and 1970's. 
14 
however, that not every interaction between religion and 
government is per se unconstitutional. As one who toler-
ates religion as broadly as possible, 2 Brennan argues that 
the free exercise principle should be dominant whenever the 
two clauses,are in tension. He wrote, "the two clauses, 
although distinct in their objectives and their applicabil-
ity, emerged from a common panorama of history 113 : the 
Founding Fathers determination to make government and re-
ligion independent of each other. There are at least three 
distinct schools of thought that influenced the Founding 
~athers in drawing a separating line4 between the govern-
ment and religion: the evangelical; the Jeffersonian; and 
the Madisonian. Laurence H. Tribe describes these three 
schools in the following passage: 
first, the evangelical view (associated primari-
ly with Roger Williams) that 'worldly corruptions 
• • .might consume the churches if sturdy fences 
against the wilderness were not maintained'; sec-
ond, the Jeffersonian view that the church should 
be walled off from the state in order to safeguard 
secular interests (public and private) 'against 
ecclesiastical depredations and incursions': and, 
2To some degree, Brennan's Catholicism possibly fig-
ures with regard to his toleration of religion. 
3schoo~strict ot.....Abbington 'rownsmJ2....Y..1. ~chefill29, 
83 s.ct. 1560 (1963), p. 1577. 
4 Brennan does not subscribe to the doctrinaire "wall" 
metaphor as a description of the separation characterizing 
religion-government relations. Rather, he views the se~a­
ration in terms of an "elusive" line that requires clari-
fication. 
third, the Madisonian view that religion and sec-
ular interests alike would be advanced best by 
diffusing and decentralizing power so as to assure 
the competition among sects rather than dominance 
by any one.5 
15 
Brennan subscribes to the latter. He holds that the real-
ization of ooth government's and religion's high purposes 
is contingent on keeping the t~o separate. over the years, 
consonant with his shift toward absolutism, his determina-
tion to keep them apart has increased. 
The breakdown of ethical consensus underlies his 
freedom of religion opinions. According to G. ~dward 
white, "religious dogma was a major source of (America's) 
shared communal values (prior to 1850). 116 This source, 
however, has diminished since then with the rise of indus-
trialization and urbanization. Consequently, theological 
explanations were supplanted in the second half of the 
nineteenth century by scientific and secular ones, and, 
also, in the twentieth century by social science ones. The 
1960's and 1~70's phase of this breakdown, moreover, ":tos-
tered a strong interest in identifying one's own personal 
5 
'b . . t. l Laurence H. Tri e, Am§~can Co~tu iona Law 
(Mineola, New York: The ~-oundation Press, Inc., 1~78), 
pp. 816-817. i<.lso, see t-lark De Wolfe Howe, :!be Goxernment 
.an.d...~ Wi~rness; ~gion .an~overnment in Affierican 
Hi.§~ (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1965), for a more detailed account of the influence 
of the evangelical and Jeffersonian views. 
6
white, ~!U:Il§ of A!DJU:~1LLegal Thought, p. 167. 
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convictions (and values)," 7 which in turn, has led to a 
greater diversification of religious practices in America. 
Tribe asserts, "religion in America, always pluralistic, 
has become radically so in the latter gart of the twentieth 
century. 118 
The issue of religious services in the public schools 
was, and still is, controversial in the United states. In 
the cases ot Engel v. VitQ!.e (1962) and ~bool_Qistrict of 
~ngton Township_Y..t.~~ {1963), the supreme court 
declared that the recitation of the New York state Board 
of Regent's recommended twenty-two word "non-sectarian" 
prayer in the public schools, and Pennsylvania's law re-
quiring that at least ten verses from the Holy Bi.ble be 
read daily without comment in its public schools, violated 
the Establishment Clause. lirennan joined in the majority 
opinion in Engel, but wrote a concurring opinion in Schempp 
because of his "great uneasiness that the court's injunc-
tion of strict neutrality between religion and non-religion 
might have too wide a sweep in banning 'every vestige of 
cooperation between religion and government, however 
slight. 1 " 9 In his 74-page concurring opinion, he argued 
7 h' w ite, :i:ort i..sw in e.m~ric9, p. 213. 
8 . Tribe, p. 826. 
9 Kelly and Har.bison, p. 976. 
17 
that the Founding Fathers intended in the Establishment 
Clause "to end the extension ot civil government's support 
of religion in a manner which made the two in some degree 
. 10 h h' . t t' 11 interdependent." In a quest to onor t is in en ion, 
he adopted and applied Justice Robert H. Jackson's test for 
determining whether a particular exercise violated the 
Clause. He summarized the test as follows: 
the Clause enjoins those involvements of reli-
gious with secular institutions which (a) serve the 
essentially religious activities of religious in-
stitutions; (b) employ the organs of government 
for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use es-
sentially religious means to serve governmental 
ends where secular means would suffice.12 
He concluded that Pennsylvania's law clearly represented 
a form of involvement that violated the Establishment 
Clause, for it employed the public schools, an organ of 
government, for essentially religious purposes (i.e., the 
inculcation of Christian values). 
~DW!Jlm is illuminating because it implicates the 
10 Schempp, p. 1577. 
11 d. t • . . . d Accor ing o M. Howe s interpretation, Brennan oes 
not rely heavily upon the :Founding Fathers' original under-
standing with respect to the religion clauses. Howe ar-
gued in ~ Gard.mi__,and The Wilderness that their original 
understanding was best expressed in the evangelical view, 
and that the Supreme Court had distorted it by relying al-
most exclusively upon the Jeffersonian view. while his 
argument is appealing, it is incomplete. Granted, some of 
the ~~unding Fathers were influenced by the evangelical 
view, but others undoubtedly were influenced by the Jeffer-
sonian view. In short, both are correct, and aptly ex-
pressed in the Madisonian view as adopted by Brennan. 
12 ~hempp, p. 1576. 
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oreakdown of ethical consensus. Underlying Brennan's opin-
ion is his objection to the state involving itself in the 
inculcation of Christian values, particularly, considering 
the fact that many of the students and their parents were 
not of the Christian faith. Furthermore, many of those who 
were Christian did not completely agree with the particular 
values and doctrines enunciated. In short, Brennan thinks 
that the individual is afforded freedom of conscience 
{i.e., the right to believe as he wishes) by the Eirst 
Amendment, and that the government is .banned from tampering 
with this freedom in most contexts, including the area of 
religious belief or non-belief. 
~sbyteriAn.-~l.lr~i.n_.t.be Uniteg s~~ v. Mar~ 
l:iliz_gbe;klL.Jil:!.l..e Hull...b~liLl!!"esb~te~IL~hu~.b ( 1~69) , 
presented the supreme Court with the question whether the 
courts could resolve a church property dispute which turned 
on doctrinal differences. In 1~66, two local Presby-
terian Churches in Savannah, Georgia, voted to withdraw 
trom the general church on doctrinal grounds. After a com-
mission of the general church took over the administration 
of the local churches, the latter bypassed appeals to high-
er church authorities and sued in state court to enjoin the 
mother church from interfering with their exclusive use and 
control of the local church properties. The general church 
cross-claimed for similar injunctive relief. The Georgia 
Supreme Court granted the Blue Hull Church custody of the 
19 
property on the ground that the United States Presbyterian 
Church had departed from established church doctrine. 13 
Brennan, speaking for the majority, reversed based on the 
principle that civil courts must defer resolution of all 
ecclesiastical questions to a religion's internal decision-
making organs. He declared that "it is of course true that 
the state has a legitimate interest in resolving property 
disputes, and that a civil court is a proper forum for that 
resolution. 1114 He stated, however, that the Establishment 
Clause "severely circumscribes the role that civil courts 
may play in resolving church property disputes." 15 He 
contended that it prevented the courts, as an agency of the 
government, from playing a role in resolving church prop-
erty disputes that turned on resolution of ecclesiastical 
questions. He concluded that this case requited the courts 
to resolve such questions, and as a result, the Georgia 
supreme court holding could not stand under the Bstablish-
13These departures from established church doctrine 
included such actions as the ordination of women ministers, 
the making of pronouncements on civil matters, the support 
ot steps to end Bible reading in the schools, and the 
teaching of nee-orthodoxy alien to the contession of Eaith 
and Cathechism as originally adopted by the general church. 
~hese departures, moreover, reflect the Presbyterian Church 
of u.s.A.'s attempts to articulate some new religious con-
sensus as a means of curbing its further breakdown. 
14Presbyteri.an Chui-ch in the Yfilte~~il v. Ma-'=~ 
Ull~h....~ Hull ~morial._fX§~.t.§rian .c.mt.n;,b, 89 
s.ct. 601 (1969), p. 605. 
15Ibi.Q...., p. 606. 
ment clause. Indeed, he held that any application of a 
departure-from-doctrine test by a civil court resolving a 
dispute over property was forbidden by the religion 
clauses. He commanded both parties to restructure their 
dispute so as to require the civil courts to resolve only 
non-ecclesiastical questions. 
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In 1969, Chief Justice Earl ~arren retired, thus sig-
nalling the end of the warren court era, and in his stead, 
President Nixon appointed Warren E. Burger. On the whole, 
the Burger court has continued the warren Court's strict 
separationist stand on the interaction of religion and 
government. Chief Justice Burger, however, did not em-
brace this stand, but rather, unsuccessfully attempted to 
win majority support for his compromise approach between 
separationist and accommodationist positions. 16 His ap-
proach initially revealed itself in li.Q~ v. Tax commission 
.Qt_;&b~ City oL.....Hew Xo~& (1970). Speaking for the court, 
he held that New York's statute exempting churches from 
real property taxes did not violate the Establishment 
Clause. The fact that such exemptions dated back to colo-
nial times and existed, with various modifications, in 
every state and the District of Columbia weighed heavily 
in his decision, as well as in Brennan's concurrence. In 
his opinion, Brennan conducted an examination of the his-
16 
Kelly and Harbison, p. 995. 
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tory, purpose, and operation of real property tax exemp-
tions for religious organizations in order to determine 
whether such exemptions breached the Establishment Clause. 
Against the background of this examination, he concluded 
that they did not breach the Clause, for they did not (a) 
serve the essentially religious activit~es of religious in-
stitutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essen-
tially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially reli-
gious means to serve governmental ends where secular means 
would suffice. He supported this decision by stating that 
"the principle effect of the tax exemptions was to carry 
out secular purposes--the encouragement of public service 
activities and of a pluralistic society. 1117 He further 
stated that "the means employed by churches to carry on 
their public services ••• are the same means used by any 
other purely secular organization---money, human time and 
skills, physical facilities. 1118 Finally, he wrote, "all 
churches by their existence contribute to the diversity of 
association, viewpoint, and enterprise so highly valued 
by all of us. 1119 
17 
he.l~__11ax Co~§§ion of ,tbe city of New York, 90 
s.ct. 1409 (1970), p. 1424. 
18 . l.Q~, p. 1424. 
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Ibid., p. 1424. Citation of this contribution is 
in line with Brennan's broader adherence to the political 
toundation of the rirst Amendment. In short, he believes 
that tax exemptions for churches furthers the "self-gov-
erning powers" of the American people. 
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'l'he issue of federal and state appropriations for 
private sectarian schools has come, in various forms, be-
fore the Burger court. This issue increasingly drew the 
public's attention, and indeed after 1967, it became the 
dominant "establishment" question. Brennan consistently 
has held that such aid violates the Establishment Clause, 
for it, at the very least, indirectly benefits the schools' 
sectarian purposes. In Lemon v. Kurtzman {1971}, the ques-
tion was raised whether three state statutes providing tor 
direct subsidies from public funds for secular activities 
carried on by sectarian educational institutions violated 
the Establishment Clause. The court held that they vio-
lated the Clause, for they involved "excessive entangle-
ment" between church and state. 20 In a concurring opin-
ion, Brennan examined the purpose and operation of the 
particular statutes in order to ascertain whether they 
breached the Establishment Clause. Against this back-
ground, he concluded that they, unlike property tax exemp-
tions in ~~. violated the Clause because they failed to 
pass muster under the three-factor test--secular purpose, 
primary secular effect, and absence of excessive entangle-
20 The risk posed by the statutes for political divi-
sion along religious lines figured in the court's judge-
ment. 'l'he "excessive entanglement" standard derived from 
the third prong of the Jacksonian test, and it reflected 
the strong separationist stance associated primarily with 
Justices Black and Douglas. 
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l . db h' 21 ment--app ie y im. He asserted that the statutes im-
permissibly involved the States and the ~·ederal Government 
with essentially religious activities of sectarian educa-
tional institutions, and that each government used essen-
tially religious means to serve governmental ends, where 
secular means would suffice. He proclaimed that when aid 
flows directly to the sectarian institution the function of 
religious instruction benefits. He wrote, "the statutes 
require 'too close a proximity' of government to the sub-
sidized sectarian institutions and in my view create real 
dangers of 'the secularization of a creed. 1 " 22 
Prior to 1975, Brennan had always applied the three-
factor test in Establishment Clause cases; however, in Meek 
v. Pittenger (1975), he expressly added a fourth--the poli-
tical divisiveness factor. He added this factor because 
the conflict over the issue of public appropriations for 
private sectarian schools threatened to divide the elec-
21Public education is a key to understanding ~hy he 
distinguishes the two cases. In .b,2~, he justified his 
decision by claiming that church property tax exemptions 
encourage churches to carry out public service activities. 
In ~rnon, however, he infers that public education is not 
one of those activities. In short, it is the function ot· 
the state, not religious institutions. Another key is 
history. Brennan argued in ~ that history overwhelm-
ingly showed that property tax exemptions for churches were 
an accepted form of interaction between government and re-
ligion. Conversely, in Lemon, he claims that history re-
veals that public subsidy of sectarian schools is not an 
acceptable form of interaction. 
2 2T . .c 1l' t .. a&mon v~yr zmap, 91 s.ct. 2105 (1971), p. 2129. 
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torate along religious lines. Organized religion, in par-
ticular, heavy catholic populations in the Northeastern 
states, were seeking economic resources for their private 
schools through the political arena. According to Brennan, 
the factor had been added without express recognition by 
th t . 23 e cour in Lemon. The factor guarded against excessive 
political entanglement of government and religion along 
religious lines. Brennan declared that "political division 
along religious lines was one of the principle evils 
against which the ~irst .Amendment was intended to pro-
tect.1124 Relying upon the tactor, he concluded that all 
the provisions in Pennsylvania's law providing tor state 
expenditures in connection with the education of students 
231n Lemgn, Burger predicted that "continuing finan-
cial pressure on nonpublic schools would, because of the 
annual nature of appropriations, generate considerable and 
recurring political activity to maintain, if not increase 
state aid. Since the vast majority of nonpublic schools 
are church affiliated, loboying would inevitably be mounted 
along religious lines ... He declared that "this probability 
that religious partisanship would intrude into the l:)Oliti-
cal arena could not be tolerated." According to Tribe, 
hffierican Constitutional Law (1978), p. 867, the Court's re-
liance upon the political-divisiveness test in Lemon, Com=. 
m.U~~g_x_fyQl_i~~ucation L.~~.t ( 1~7 3) , and tieek is 
"best understood as limiting the political role ot orga-
nized religion when it seeks institutional power or econom-
ic resources tor itself, but not when it seeks to persuade 
others of its views on public issues." 
24Meek v. Pittenger, 95 s.ct. 1753 (1975), p. 1769. 
It can not be reiterated enough that Brennan subscribes to 
the political foundation view of the Idrst Amendment. In 
this particular case, he believes that the possibility of 
political division along religious lines can not be toler-
ated, for it is a threat to the normal political process 
and the realization of the "self-governing powers." 
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in nonpublic schools violated the Establishment Clause. 
In 1971, the ~aryland legislature enacted a statute 
that authorized the payment of noncategorical grants to 
private colleges awarding more than just seminarian or 
theological degrees: 5 of the 17 institutions receiving 
funds under the program in 1971 were religiously aff ili-
ated. In response to LemQn and other supreme court deci-
sions prohibiting certain types of aid to parochial schools 
the legislature amended the statute in 1~72 to ban the use 
of money for "sectarian purposes." In Roeme.L..L_lioard of 
Public works of Ma~ylan~ (1976), the supreme court upheld 
the constitutionality ot the grants despite the aided col-
leges' formal affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church on 
the ground that they did not have the "primary effect" of 
advancing religion. In a dissenting opinion, Brennan stuck 
to his strict view of the Establishment Clause with respect 
to appropriations to religiously affiliated schools. The 
strict view, or as Tribe defines it~••the remote-indirect-
and-incidental standard"-compels a more searching inquiry 
than the "primary effect" test, and comes closer to the ab-
solutist no-aid approach to the Establishment Clause. Re-
calling his concurrence in ~.QD, he declared that it is 
"pure fantasy" to assert that the religious mission of the 
schools does not benefit in some direct or indirect way by 
aid to "secular" aspects of a church-related school. He 
argued that the law "exposes state money for use in advanc-
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. 1 . . ..2s ing re igion. He declared that .. the discrete interests 
of government and religion are mutually best served when 
each avoids too close proximity to the other. 1126 He be-
lieves that it is not only the nonbeliever who benefits 
from keeping the two separate, but also the devout be-
l . 27 iever. He wrote: 
It is not only the nonbeliever who tears the in-
jection of sectarian doctrines and controversies 
into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is 
the devout believer who fears the secularization 
of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with 
and dependent upon government.28 
He concluded that the Statute breached the Establishment 
Clause because it required 11 too close a proximity" between 
government and religion. 
In the companion cases of ~owen v. Maryland (1~61), 
~Guys I:'rom Harrison-A1lentown .x. McGin~ (1~61), ~un-
25B.Qemer y.....__liQard of Public Works of ~lanQ, 96 
s.ct. 2337 (1976), ~· 2356. 
26Ibid,, p. 2357. This statement echoes, as Tribe 
describes, "a Madisonian concern that secular and religious 
authorities not interfere excessively with one another's 
respective spheres of choice and influence, lest both gov-
ernment and religion be corrupted, the political system 
strained 'to the breaking point,• and liberty of conscience 
ultimately compromised. 11 
27This belief is a perfect reflection of Brennan's 
liberalism in the area of religious treedom. In The Gar~ 
.and ·rhe~.ilderne§s, Howe claimed that placing the believer 
and non-believer on an equal plane vis-a-vis the religious 
clauses, as Brennan does, mirrors the Warren court's ten-
dency to make equality the central objective of constitu-
tional government. He argued, however, that this placement 
is an imprecise reading of the clauses' historical intent. 
28 ~ll· p. 2357. 
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~ld v. Brsuai (1961), and ~lagher y. Crolm Kosher super-
!!!.9~ (1961), the supreme Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of Sunday Closing Laws. The Court held that the 
laws in question did not violate the ~'irst Amendment's 
guarantee of religious freedom and anti-establishment. 
Chief Justice warren concluded that they regulated secular 
activities, not religious ones. Brennan joined in his de-
cision in the first two cases, but dissented from his de-
cision in the latter two. In Braunfeld and Qgllaghe~, un-
like in ~wen and ~Ginley, the emphasis shifted from 
anti-establishment to free exercise claims. 
Brennan's dissent in ia-.sw.n.teld covered both cases. 
The petitioner, a retailer who belonged to the Orthodox 
Jewish faith challenged the Pennsylvania laws, alleging 
that the enforced closing of his store on Sunday, combined 
with his voluntary closing on Saturday for religious rea-
sons, would render him unable to continue his business. 
Brennan agreed with the majority's opinion that Pennsyl-
vania's law did not violate the Establishment Clause, but 
he dissented from its view that it did not abridge the 
petitioner's right to practice his Jewish faith. He wrote, 
"religious freedom--the freedom to believe and to practice 
strange and, it may be foreign creeds29--has classically 
29 h' T is statement reflects the greater diversificat.ton 
of religious practices that has characterized the latter 
part of twentieth century America. 
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been one of the highest values of our society. 1130 He fur-
ther wrote, "the rights of conscience are, in their nature, 
of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest 
touch of the governmental hand. 1131 He claimed that the law 
penalized Braunfeld by placing him at a substantial com-
petitive disadvantage with his non-Jewish competitors, for 
his religious faith compelled him to close his store on 
Saturday and the law forced him to close on Sunday. He 
stated that the law, in effect, made Braunfeld choose be-
tween his business and his religion. 32 Moreover, he con-
tended that the law, like one declared unconstitutional in 
an earlier case, imposed a virtual tax on Braunfeld's right 
to exercise his religion. He thus concluded that it clear-
ly breached the Eree Exercise Clause. 
Brennan's approach in freedom of religion cases re-
f lects his determination to safeguard the high purposes of 
government and religion by keeping the two separate and in-
dependent of each other. His approach is consistent with 
30 ~.aynfeld y. ~n. 81 s.ct. 1144 (1961), p. 11so. 
31
.iQiQ..s., p. 1152. 
321n the face of free exercise claims, Brennan would 
declare all Sunday Closing Laws unconstitutional, for the 
"mere convenience of having everyone rest on the same day" 
is not a legitimate state interest to infringe religious 
freedom. On the other hand, he would not do the same in 
the face of anti-establishment claims as in ~~n and 
~~ because the laws were, in spite of their reli-
gious origin, now primarily secular in character and pur-
pose. In short, while the laws clearly did not serve to 
establish religion, they did inhibit the free exercise 
thereof. 
29 
the Madisonian view ot the historical intent ot the reli-
gion clauses. In his quest to honor this intent, he ini-
tially adopt~d and applied a three-factor test, and later, 
he added a fourth in anti-establishment cases. Against the 
oackground of this test, his opinions mirror a propensity 
to declare unconstitutional almost all acts that involve 
interaction between government and religion. tw1oreover, 
they reflect the breakdown of ethical consensus in con-
temporary America, and a movement toward an absolutist no-
aid stance. In the cases of Schempp and Presbyterian 
church (U.s.a.A...l_, he proclaimed that government support of 
prayer in the public schools, and judicial review ot ec-
clesiastical questions breached the hsta.blishment Clause. 
ln Lemon, t~+eek, and t<.oemer, he declared that public sub-
sidy of sectarian educational institutions inf ringed tne 
Clause. 
On the other hand, he announced in ~ that church 
property tax exemptions did not violate the hstablishment 
clause. At tirst glance, his decision seems to be an in-
consistency; however, atter scratching the surface, one 
finds that it is not. At the very least, Brennan views 
such exemptions as the lesser of two evils because they 
entail less entanglement than would taxation. .Moreover, 
he looked at the history of such tax exemptions and found 
that they led to a greater free exercise of all forms of 
religious faith, not to an established church. In Braun-
30 
telg, he claimed that the ~unday closing Laws did not vio-
late the ~stablishment Clause, for they served secular pur-
poses. conversely, he held that they abridged the individ-
ual's right to practice his religious faith. 
Brennan argued in Roemer that the religion clauses 
protect both the non-believer and believer on equal terms. 
In ~~~Q.....V. Watkina (1961), 33 the Supreme court, speak-
ing through Justice Black, held that a law requiring a 
declaration of belief in God as a condition of becoming a 
notary public was unconstitutional, for it placed that 
state "on the side of one particular sort of believers." 
Brennan joined in Black's opinion. In .both cases, the non-
believer and believer are placed on the same level in re-
lation to the religion clauses. In sum, this placement 
illuminates Brennan's liberalism in the area ot religious 
freedom and anti-establishment, for it reflects his pro-
clivity to make equality the central objective of consti-
tutional government. 




'I'he Meiklejohnian interpretation of. the t irst Amend-
ment's guarantee of free expression is the foundation of 
Brennan's approach in this area. He agrees with Dr. 
Alexander f't1eiklejohn' s argument that in creating "a form 
of government under which they granted only some powers 
to the federal and state instruments they established," 
the American people exhibited a basic determination "to 
govern themselves rather than be governed by others. 111 
He concurs that the guarantee of free expression "is the 
repository of these self-governing powers. 112 :t·inally, he 
acknowledges that freedom of expression absolutely pro-
tects from abridgement all torms ot expression that fall 
-within the category of subjects having "governing impor-
tance." r.chese subjects included all expression which di-
~tl,:i sustained and furthered the self-governing powers 
of the people. over the years, Brennan has expanded the 
category of "self-governing subjects" beyond that outlined 
1 
·11· wi 1 am J. Brennan, "The Supreme court and the 
Meiklejohnian Interpretation of the F'irst Amendment," 
HA~vard Law Review, 79 (November, 1965), p. 11. 
2Ibid., p. 12. 
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by Meiklejohn3 to include expression that may indirectly 
contribute to the knowledge of the electorate. This ex-
pansion, fueled partly by the increasing absolutism in the 
scholarly studies4 he has relied upon and the breakdown of 
ethical consensus, mirrors Brennan's movement toward an 
absolutist position. 
The companion cases of llg~nblatt v..L....Ynij;ed St..9£~ 
(1959) and Uphaus v. wyman (1959) involved the relationship 
between the governmental investigatory function and the 
~irst ~~endment. The congressional investigatory power is 
implicit in the Constitution's grant of "legislative pow-
ers 0 to Congress. 'l.1he power, however, is not unlimited. 
It can be exercised only to the extent that it is pertinent 
to the formulation of legislation. During the l~SO's, con-
gress exercised this power in an effort to expose the com-
munist conspiracy. Barenblatt's conviction for contempt 
of Congress for refusing to answer questions before a House 
Un-American Activities subcommittee investigating communism 
in education pertaining to his past and/or present member-
ship in the Communist Party gave birth to the former case. 
30 
••• free speech is protected by the first amend-
ment as essential to intelligent self-government in a demo-
cratic system. As expounded by Alexander .Meiklejohn, its 
most widely cited proponent, the theory would limit the 
special guarantees of the first amendment to public issues 
of civil importance." Tribe, p. 577. 
4These scholarly studies include the writings and 
commentaries of Laurence H. Tribe, ~i.£gn_~~~utional 
Law, and 'I'homas I. I:;merson, ·rbe sy~-2.t.._.1;··reedom of :E.x-
~ssig,n (New York: Vintage Books, 1970). 
The supreme court sustained the conviction on the ground 
that the government's right to selt-preservation in the 
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face of communist subversive activities was more important 
than Barenblatt's First Amendment rights. In a short dis-
senting opinion, Brennan declared that the purpose of the 
congressional investigation was "exposure purely for the 
sake of exposure," and that this was not a valid purpose to 
which the government could subordinate Barenblatt's Eirst 
Amendment rights. 5 
The origin of the latter case was Uphaus' conviction 
for contempt tor refusing to answer questions or to produce 
certain documents for an anti-communist investigation into 
higher education conducted by the state of New Hampshire's 
attorney general under an authorizing resolution of the 
state legislature. AS in Barenbl.at~, the supreme court 
affirmed the public's hysteria over the threat of a com-
rnunist conspiracy by balancing away the individual's tirst 
;Jnendment rights in favor of the government's need for 
self-preservation. In another dissenting opinion, Brennan 
declared that the legislature's authorizing resolution 
clearly invaded Uphaus' constitutional rights ot freedom 
of speech and assembly. He argued that the sole purpose of 
the legislative investigation in question was "exposure 
solely for the sake of exposure." He wrote: 
5~enblatt l!..!.. .. United State.§ I 79 s. ct. 1081 ( 1959), 
p. 1114. 
The investigation, as revealed by the report, 
was overwhelmingly and predominately a roving 
self-contained investigation of individual and 
group behavior, and behavior in a constitutional-
ly protected area. Its whole approach was to name 
names, disclose information about those named, and 
observe that 'facts are facts.•6 
He further argued that the state of New Hampshire was un-
able to show any state interest sufficient to subordinate 
Uphaus' constitutionally protected freedom of expression. 
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In short, "exposure" was not "a valid legislative interest 
of the state." consequently, he concluded, as in Baren-
blat£, that the conviction for contempt must be reversed. 
The striking thing in both Barenblatt and Uphaus was 
that Brennan, the liberal, used the balancing test. The 
test was adopted and applied by conservatives in the post-
~orld war II era as a means of realizing their political 
values of stability, order, and security. 7 conservatives 
such as Justices l"elix E'rankf urter and John Marshall Harlan 
balanced civil liberty claims against proposed governmental 
policy reasons for abridging them. Giving more weight to 
governmental interests vis-a-vis those of the individual, 
they of ten ruled in favor of the government. Brennan bal-
anced the same factors, but, unlike the conservatives, he, 
consistent with his libertarian concern for individual 
freedom and the open society, shifted the overburdening 
6 ~haus v. w~, 79 s.ct. 1040 (1959), .p. 1056. 
7 Kelly and Harbison, pp. 825-826. 
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weight to the side of the individual. over the years, re-
flecting his movement toward an absolutist position, he has 
increasingly added weight to the individual's side of the 
balance. consequently, he almost always has decided in 
favor of the individual. Finally, his use of the test is 
an example of his pragmatic liberalism, in that, his meth-
od, in this case, was conservative, but his end was lib-
er al. 
In July 1963, Dr. Corliss LaMont was notified by the 
Post Office that, pursuant to section 305 of the Postal 
service and .tederal Employees Salary Act of 1~62, 8 it was 
detaining an unsolicited copy of the ,f§king Revi~ that 
had been addressed to him. Lat¥1ont promptly sued on r irst 
Amendment grounds. In LaMont y, Postm.G\ster General ot 
UniteQ_~~ (1965), a unanimous court held that section 
305 was unconstitutional, for it placed a limitation on the 
addressee's ~irst Amendment rights. In a concurring opin-
ion, Brennan stated that in the absence of an overriding 
governmental interest, each person has an unconditional 
right of access to publications. He argued that "in the 
area ot first Ainendment freedoms, government has the duty 
to confine itself to the least intrusive regulations which 
8
'I1he act authorized the Post Office to detain and de-
stroy mail that had been determined by the Postmaster Gene-
ral to be communist "political" p~opaganda, unless the mail 
was requested by the addressee or unless it was otherwise 
ascertained that delivery was sought. 
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are adequate for the purpose. 119 .turthermore, he asserted 
that "if the government wishes to withdraw a subsidy or 
privilege, it must do so by means and on terms which do not 
endanger First Amendment rights. 1110 .Einally, he drew an 
analogy between this practice and the practices of "the 
feared and hated" communistic regimes from "Whence the prop-
aganda emanated. He proclaimed: 
That the governments which originate this prop-
aganda themselves have no equivalent guarantees 
only highlights the cherished values of our con-
stitutional framework1 it can never justify emu-
lating the practice of restrictive regimes in the 
name of expediency.11 
New York's loyalty program under the controverted 
Feinberg Law which, among other things, made membership in 
the communist Party prima facie evidence of disqualif ica-
~ . LaNont y. Postmaster General of united statil§, 85 s. 
ct. 14~8 (1~65), p. 1498. Brennan did not shut the door 
on governmental regulation of· free expression in this area, 
nor did he explicitly outline what would constitute "a 
least intrusive regulation." One thing is certain though, 
Brennan believes that such a regulation can not cast the 
Postmaster General, indeed any Administrator, in the role 
ot censor or "Big Brother," for he is not equipped to do 
so. 
101bi"1._, p. 1498. The right to access of publica-
tions is an implicit E'irst Amendment right. Brennan point-
ed out that 11 the scope of the Bill of Rights extends beyond 
the enumerated guarantees to protect correlative interests 
without which the rights expressed would not be fully safe-
guarded." He concluded that "the right to receive publi-
cations is such an interest because the Eirst Amendment's 
protection of the 'dissemination of ideas can accomplish 
nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to 
receive and consider them.'" 
11Ibi~, p. 1498. 
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tion for appointment or retention in the public-school sys-
tem came, for the last time, before the court in Keyishian 
y, Board of Regents of the University Qi the state of New 
York (1~67). The law was enacted in 1949, and sustained 
by the Vinson court in the case of ~dler v. Board of Educa-
.t.!gn (1952), But by 1967, the anti-communist crusade had 
long ago burned out. Brennan, speaking for the court, pro-
claimed that the "classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace 
of ideas. 11112 Indeed, he announced that "the Nation's 
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure 
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers the truth 
'out of a multitude ot tongues, rather than through any 
kind of authoritative selection, 11113 He asserted, there-
fore, that "the rirst Amendment does not tolerate laws that 
14 
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." And that 
since "r·irst Amendment freedoms need breathing space to 
survive, government may regulate in the area only with nar-
row specificity, 1115 Against this background, he concluded 
that "New York's complicated and intrinsic scheme" clearly 
violated freedom of expression, and as such was unconsti-
12Keyi§.bi.an_~ The Board of Regent~t the Universi~ 
~_the state of New York, 87 s.ct. 675 (1967), p. 683. 
13Ibid,, p. 683. 
14Ibig,, p. 683. 
15 Ibid. , p. 684. F·or Brennan, "narrow specificity" 
means that government must define in extremely narrow and 
clear terms what it intends to regulate. 
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tutional. 
In 1971, the Nixon Administration demanded that the 
supreme court enjoin two national newspapers, ~~lLXQl:k 
ti™ and the .rtashington Post, from publishing "the con-
tents of a classified study entitled 'History of United 
states Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy.'" In 
New York Tim~Company y. United~tates (1971), the court 
refused the demand on the ground that the Administration 
had not met its burden of showing justification for impo-
sition of prior restraint on publication of the "Pentagon 
Papers." The fact that all the Justices wrote opinions il-
lustrates both the importance of the issue, and the puo-
lic's justifiable interest in the study. Brennan wrote a 
separate concurring opinion to emphasize that "the F'irst 
Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints 
of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that un-
toward consequences may result. 1116 He conceded, however, 
that there existed a single, extremely narrow class ot 
cases in which the F'irst Amendment• s ban on prior judicial 
restraint may be overridden. He declared that 
our cases thus far indicated that such cases may 
arise only when the Nation 'is at war,' during 
which time 'no one would question but that govern-
16li§lL_X~Times Company v. Uniteg States, 91 S.Ct. 
2140 (1971}, p. 2147. According to the Meiklejohnian in-
terpretation, the historical study on Vietnam policy fell 
into the class of expression that had "governing impor-
tance." Therefore, Brennan afforded it aosolute protec-
tion. 
ment might prevent actual obstruction to its re-
cruiting service or the publication of the sailing 
dates of transports or the number or location of 
troops.17 
18 He concluded that since the nation was not at war, the 
government's action constituted a prior restraint of the 
press that clearly violated the freedom of expression. 
At issue in Broadric]Lv.._oklahoma (1~73) 19 was the 
state of Oklahoma's statute forbidding "public" political 
. 't 20 b t l h t h ld act1v1 y y s ate emp oyees. T e supreme cour up e 
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the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that its 
overbreadth was not substantial. Brennan dissented. He 
argued that the statute was impermissibly vague because it 
failed "to provide the necessary 'sensitive tools' to carry 
out the 'separation of legitimate from illegitimate 
17Ibid,, P• 2147. 
181n terms of the constitution, Brennan did not look 
upon Vietnam as a war because United states' military in-
volvement in southeast Asia never was pursuant to a formal 
congressional declaration of war. At most, the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution of 1~64 was an informal declaration, but in 
January 1971, congress repealed it. 
19 Justices Lewis :t·. Powell and william H. Rehnquist 
had joined the court in Octooer, 1972. Along with Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Harry A. Blackmun they combined 
to form a strong law-and-order bloc. After 1975, this 
bloc, al.though not always coherent, became the majority 
with the addition of Justice John Paul Stevens. In many 
cases, Brennan reacted to this oloc, thus, making his lib-
eralism more pronounced. 
20This activity included engaging in political-fund 
raising, belonging to any political party committee, being 
an officer or member of any partisan political club, run-
ning for any paid public office, or taking part in the 
management or affairs of any political party or campaign. 
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speech. 11121 consequently, according to him, the Act was 
"capable of application that would prohibit speech and con-
duct clearly protected by the Eirst Amendment, 1122 and as 
such, it violated the guarantee of free expression. 
In colwnbia Broadcasting ~tern. Inc. y, Democratic 
National commission {1973), the Supreme Court held that the 
"public interest" standard of the communication Act of 1934 
did not require radio and television stations to sell 
broadcasting time for editorial advertising. Brennan wrote 
a dissenting opinion. He claimed that the principle at 
stake was one of fundamental importance, for it concerned 
the people's right to partake in vigorous debate through 
the broadcast media. He proceeded from the assumption, 
contrary to the court, that "it is the right of the view-
ers and listeners, not the broadcasters, which is para-
mount.1123 He proclaimed that the .tirst Amendment "itself 
testifies to our 'profound national commitment to the prin-
ciple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wideopen. 1124 He argued that "'it is only 
through free debate and free exchange of ideas that govern-
21Broadrict y. Oklahoma, 93 s.ct. 2908 (1973), p. 
2924. 
22Ibid,, p. 2924, 
23~~iA Broadcasting System. Inc. y, Democratic 
National commission, 93 s.ct. 2080 (1973), p. 2127. Fur-
therance of "self-governing powers" is contingent upon an 
informed public, i.e., viewers and listeners. 
24Jbid~, P• 2127. 
ment remains responsive to the will of the people and 
peaceful change is effected. 1 " 25 Moreover, he asserted 
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that this commitment to "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen" 
public de.bate is only realized if it is allowed to operate 
in an effective forum. The fact that in the 1~60's thou-
sands of Americans took to the streets to publicize their 
grievances seems to prevade his opinion. Indeed, he wrote: 
For our citizens may now find greater than ever 
the need to express their own views directly to 
the public, rather than through a governmentally 
appointed surrogate, if they are to feel that they 
can achieve at least some measure of control over 
their own destinies.26 
A candidate for the Ohio General Assembly in the dis-
trict including the city of shaker Heights sought to pur-
chase placard space on the vehicles of the city's Rapid 
Transit system. The system's advertising agent intorrned 
the candidate that although space was then available, the 
company's contract with the city forbade display ot politi-
cal messages. Indeed, the transit system had never accept-
ed such advertisements, but had regularly accepted commer-
cial ones, as well as messages for churches and public ser-
vice organizations. In Lehm.g.n v. ci~2t-~A!5.er Heights 
{1974), Justice Blackmun, speaking for a court plurality, 
declared that the placard space was not a :First Amendment 
forum: therefore, the refusal to accept political adver-
25Ibi~, p. 2127. 
26~bid., p. 2123. 
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tisements did "not rise to the dignity of a r··irst Amendment 
violation." Brennan, in a passionate dissent, held that 
the city's content-based ban violated the Eirst and Four-
teenth Amendments. He claimed that by accepting and dis-
playing commercial and public service advertisements on its 
rapid transit system, the city opened a forum for communi-
cation. He declared that once a city created such a forum, 
it could not in accordance with free expression principles 
discriminate solely on the basis of subject matter or con-
tent. He concluded that the court's "sanction of the 
city's preference for bland commericialism and noncontro-
versial public service messages over 'uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open debate on public issues,'" in effect, re-
versed the traditional priorities of the E'irst Amendment. 27 
In ~x._y. spoc~ (1976), the Supreme court upheld 
the constitutionality of federal military regulations which 
banned speeches and demonstrations of a political partisan-
ship nature and prohibited distribution of literature, on a 
military base, in this case Eort Dix, New Jersey, without 
prior approval by headquarters. In a vigorous dissent, 
Brennan proclaimed that it is naive to believe that the 
military, given the fact that its interests and purposes 
are peculiarly affected by political affairs, is value-
neutral; therefore, allowing candidates of all persuasions, 
27Lebman v. city of Shalter Hai~. 94 s.ct. 2714 
(1974), p. 2723. 
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including anti-military ones, to be heard on military bases 
might have a moderating effect on the inherent politiciza-
tion of the military. In addition, he drew heavily upon 
an earlier precedent. In the earlier case of Elower v, 
IJ.nited ~tates (1972), the Court held that a peaceful leaf-
leteer could not be excluded from the main street of a mil-
itary installation to which the civilian public had been 
permitted virtually unrestricted access. Although the pri-
vate parties in Greer included one of the nation's most 
vociferous opponents of the exercise of military power, 
Brennan argued that the two cases (i.e., ,t·lower and Greer) 
could not be distinguished on t·irst Amendment grounds. As 
a result, he concluded that the regulations as applied in 
~.X violated the :tirst Amendment. 
f:irst_Ji.ational Bank of ~QILV• Be!,!otti (1978) is 
one of the few cases in which Brennan sided with the gov-
ernment in the area of free expression. Moreover, the case 
illustrates, perhaps better than any other, his adherence 
to the .Meiklejohnian interpretation. Justice Powell, writ-
ing for the majority, held that corporate expenditures in 
connection with referenda material was protected by the 
lrirst Amendment. Brennan joined in Justice White's dis-
senting opinion. \-white argued that "the communications of 
profit-making corporations are not 'an integral part of the 
development of ideas, of mental exploration and the affir-
mation of self,'" nor do they "represent a manifestation 
of individual freedom of choice. 1128 He concluded: 
There can be no doubt that corporation expendi-
ture in connection with referenda material to 
corporate business affairs falls clearly into the 
category of corporation activities which may be 
barred. The electoral process, of course, is the 
essence of our democracy. It is an arena in which 
the public's interest in preventing corporation 
domination and the coerced support by shareholders 
of causes with which they disagree is at its 
strongest and any claim that corporation expendi-
tures are integral to the economic functioning of 
the corporation is at its weakest.29 
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one of the most controversial issues today is the re-
lationship between a free press and fair trials. This is-
sue was presented to the court in the cases of ~~ 
Press A§..§ociation v. Stuart (1976) 30 and Bichm.Qnd News-
28First Nation.al Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 98 s.ct. 
1407 (1978), p. 1431. 
291bid., p. 1439. Brennan believes that organized 
labor's use of fair share monies in connection with refer-
enda material also is not afforded First p~endment protec-
tion, for it, like corporate expenditures, clogs the chan-
nels necessary for realization of the citizenry's "self-
governing powers" by circumscribing individual freedom of 
choice. see Abood_y_._Det~it Board of E.Qy~Qll. 97 s.ct. 
1782 (1977). 
30The case grew out of a multiple murder in a small 
Nebraska town which in".mediately attracted widespread local, 
regional, and national coverage. A suspect, Lrwin Charles 
Simants, was arrested and charged with murder of six mem-
bers of a family in their home in connection witn sexual 
assault. Before the preliminary hearing to determine 
whether simants should be bound over for trial, the county 
judge on motion of the prosecution and defense counsel en-
tered a broad restrictive order barring the publication of 
a vaguely defined category ot information including all 
testimony and evidence introduced at the public prelimi-
nary hearing. The supreme court unanimously struck down 
the order on l"irst l'.mendment grounds. 
. . . . ( 1uao) 31 Qapers, Inc. v, Vixg1.nia ~ •. Brennan's approach is 
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clear: he calls for an absolute rule that resort to prior 
restraints on the freedom of press is never a constitution-
ally permissible method of protecting the right to a fair 
trial. He wrote concurring opinions in both cases to em-
phasize this approach. In the former case, he wrote, "I 
unreservedly agree with Justice Black that 'free speech and 
fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our 
. ·1· t' ,,.32 civi iza ion. He asserted that 
commentary and reporting on the criminal justice 
system is at the core of the E·irst Amendment val-
ues, for the operation and integrity of that sys-
tem is of crucial import to citizens concerned 
with the administration of government. secrecy of 
judicial action can only breed ignorance and dis-
trust of courts and suspicion concerning the com-
petence and impartiality of judges: free and ro-
bust reporting, criticism, and debate can contri-
bute to public understanding of the rule of law 
and to comprehension of the functioning of the en-
tire criminal justice system, as well as improve 
the quality of that system by subjecting it to the 
cleansing effects ot exposure and public account-
ability. 33 
31
on trial for the fourth time on the same murder 
charge, one John Stevens moved to close the courtroom to 
the public in order to prevent testimony from being re-
layed to remaining witnesses and to ensure that jurors did 
not obtain information about the case outside the court-
room. The judge granted the request. Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. promptly sought to have the order vacated. The court, 
in a plurality opinion, vacated the closure order because 
the judge had failed to "take the public character of the 
trial into account." 
32 li§bratka fress Association~~~.S, 96 S.Ct. 2791 
(1976), p. 2828. 
33Ibid,, p. 2816, 
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~&oreover, he rejected the notion that a choice between the 
two values was necessary. He argued that "judges possess 
adequate tools short of injunction against reporting" by 
the press tor relieving the tension between rirst and Sixth 
Amendment values. 34 He conceded that the available al-
ternatives "may require greater sensitivity and etfort on 
the part o:t the judges. 1135 He concluded, however, "that 
sensitivity and effort is required in order to ensure the 
full enjoyment and proper accommodation of both First and 
Sixth Amendment rights. 
In R!cil.mQ.wLlJ~~~~' Brennan argued that the rirst 
d bl . . t . 1 37 Amen rnent secures a pu ic right of access to a ria • 
He argued that "the rirst l\mendment embodies more than a 
commitment to free expression and communicative interchange 
for their own sakes; it has a ~~tural X2J&. to play in 
securing and fostering our republic system ot self-govern-
341bid,, p. 2828. These "adequate tools" include the 
trial judge's control over who will try the facts: he can 
eliminate potential jurors who exhibit a prejudice as a 
result of inflammatory news accounts; he can sequester jur-
ors from one another, and from prejudicial news reports; 
and finally, if necessary, he can change the venue of the 
trial. 
J5Th;d ~.l:U,.1 p. 2828. 
36
.l&>i.d..._, p. 2828. 
37Like the right of access to publications, the pub-
lic right of access to a trial emanates from the penumbras 
of the :t·irst Amendment. See note 9, supra. 
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ment." 38 He claimed that .. under our system, judges are not 
mere umpires, but, in our own sphere, lawmakers--a coordi-
39 
nate .branch of government." He asserted, therefore, that 
the trial was a genuine governmental proceeding. Because 
he believes that "valuable public as \Well as civic behavior 
must .be informed," 40 he concluded that public access to 
trials is essential to maintaining public confidence in the 
administration of justice. 
The striking thing in Richmond is Brennan's use of 
the term "structural role." The model of "Structual Jus-
tice, 11 as described .by 'l1ribe, "seeks to achieve such ends 
as human freedom not through any one characteristic struc-
ture of choice, but through that combination of structures 
that seems .best suited to those ends in a particular con-
text. 1141 £or Brennan, the structural role of the rirst 
Amendment seeks freedom of expression through the combina-
tion ot structures best suited to realizing the republic 
system of self-government. The tact that this sounds like 
the Neiklejohnian interpretation is not .by coincidence. 
In short, Brennan borrowed Tribe's term "structural role" 
because it clearly defined his established view, consonant 
38fil,~.bm..Qrui_.Ijewspa~~L Inc. v.s._Yliginli• 100 s. Ct. 
2814 (1980), p. 2833. 
39.lJ;>~. p. 2828. 
40ibid., p. 2828. 
41Tribe, pp. 1137-1146. 
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with Meiklejohn, that the First Amendment rights of speak-
ers and listeners to communicate freely do not exist sole-
ly to protect the intrinsic value of self-expression, but 
also to preserve the process of self-governrnent~the re-
tention of meaningful control over government through pub-
lie discussion of its operation. 
The city of San Diego, in its campaign of beautifi-
cation, enacted an ordinance that totally banned bill-
ooards. In t4etromedia, Inc. v. city of San_JJli.gQ (1~81), 
a supreme court plurality, using a bifurcated approach, 
held that San Diego's ban of noncommercial billboards vio-
lated free expression, but that its ban of commercial ones 
did not. Brennan wrote a concurrence to register his 
objection to the majority's bifurcated approach. He pro-
claimed that its distinction between commercial billboards 
and noncommercial ones created E·irst Amendment problems at 
least as serious as those raised by a total ban. He wrote: 
In individual cases, this distinction is any-
thing but clear. Because making such determina-
tions would entail a substantial exercise of dis-
cretion by city's officials, it presents a real 
danger of curtailing noncommercial speech in the 
guise of regulating commercial speech.42 
He believes that this danger is indeed real because cities 
are not equipped to make decisions "based on the content 
of speech. 1143 Moreover, he argued that San Diego was un-
42~omedia, Inc. y, City Q' San Diego, 101 S.Ct. 
2882 (1981), p. 2907. 
43Ibid&, P• 2908. 
able to show that a sufficiently substantial interest was 
furthered by the total ban. 44 Thus, he concluded, unlike 
the plurality, that the ordinance's ban of commerical and 
noncommercial oillboards was unconstitutional. 
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grew out of the respondents' claim that the school board's 
removal of nine books45 from the shelves of the local 
Junior High school and High school violated their First 
Amendment rights. Brennan, speaking for a three-member 
plurality, balanced the school .board's legitimate interest 
in controlling the curriculum and the classroom against the 
individual's .tirst hltlendment right to the free access to 
46 information and ideas. On the one hand, he wrote: 
44
· t' h t . bl . . l d th ~o ice t a Brennan is a anc1ng. He oa ance e 
city of San Diego's interest in creating a "beautiful" en-
vironment against the guarantee of free expression, and de-
termined that this interest was not compelling enough to 
abridge the guarantee. ~hy did he balance? The answer 
lies in the tact that billboards are not of real "governing 
importance." Indeed, one would be hard pressed to show 
that they are. 
45The Board of hducation characterized the removed 
.books as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-semitic, and 
just plain filthy." These .oooks were Slall9~L..Hou~tiv.§ 
by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; J":WL.Rgked JU,?e, by Desmond ~iorris; 
~n....l'~se Me.QIL..S~ll§.t!h by Piri Thomas; ~-ShQ-'.LStories 
by Negro wri.tiu-A, edited by Langston Hughes; ~~~ice, 
of anonymous authorship; ~.ack Boy, .by kichard wright; A 
~2-.Ai~_li.Q.t,b~~.t.._~~ndwich, by Alice Childress; 
~lll--21L~i!, .by ~ldridge Cleaver; A.. Reader fOL..bll.t§.1;.§, 
edited oy Jerome Archer, and The F~!i.l:• by Bernard Malamud. 
46 Brennan generally balances in cases involving mi-
nors because he believes that the E'irst JiJnendrnent does not 
afford them the full protection it does adults. see pages 
65-66. 
local school boards must be permitted 'to es-
tablish and apply their curriculum in such a way 
as to transmit community values,' and that 'there 
is a legitimate and substantial community interest 
in promoting respect for authority and traditional 
values be they social, moral, or political.47 
But, on the other hand, he wrote, "the constitution pro-
tects the rights to receive information and ideas (as) an 
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inherent corrolary of the rights of free speech and 
press. 1148 He resolved the conflict by focusing on the in-
tent ot the school board. "Local school boards must dis-
charge their 'important, delicate, and highly discretionary 
functions,'" he proclaimed, "in a manner that comports with 
the transcendent imperatives of the E'irst Amendment. 114~ 
Echoing the Meiklejohnian interpretation, he declared that 
they 
may not remove books from school library shelves 
simply because they dislike the ideas contained in 
those books and seek by their removal to 'pre-
scrioe what shall be orthodox in politics, na~ion­
alism, religion, or other matters of opinion.SO 
He thus remanded the case to the lower courts tor re-hear-
ing in accordance ~ith the "political intent" test. 
~ is striking, for it illuminates many ot the tac-
tors underlying Brennan's l:-'irst Amendment a_t:>proach. one, 
47~~ ot Education, Island Trees, Etc. v. ~ico, 102 
s.ct. 2799 (1982), ~· 2806. 
48
.ll2iQLI P• 2808. 
4~Tbh;'~ ~LI PP• 2806-2807. 
501.&>isis_, p. 2810. 
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the "political intent" test sounds quite similar to the 
t-1eikle johnian "self-governing importance" test. 'l'wo, his 
statement that the government may not prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, etc., is 
the f undarnental belief in his :First p;nendment approach. 
;;nd, three, this statement reflects the breakdown of ethi-
cal consensus. 
In numerous contexts, Brennan has addressed the rirst 
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association. hriting 
for the Court, Brennan held in Natioll.91-.A§.§2~.t.!2.Il~ th~ 
£.Qvaucement of .cgJ.~ People y. Button (1963), that 
Virginia's ban .against .. the improper solicitation ot any 
legal or professional business 1151 to include the NAACP's 
legal activities abridged the First Amendment. He argued 
that its activities were modes of expression and associa-
tion protected by the ~irst Amendment. He wrote: 
'l1he basic aims and purposes of the NhACP are to 
secure the elimination of all racial barriers 
which deprive Negro citizens of the privileges and 
~urdens of equal citizenship rights in the United 
states. ·ro this end the association engages in 
extensive educational and lobbying activities. It 
51As part of its program of "massive resistance" to 
school desegregation, the Virginia legislature in 1956 made 
it a misdemeanor for any person or organization not having 
a pecuniary right or liability in a lawsuit to solicit 
legal business for itself or any attorney. Brennan did not 
shut his eyes to the legislature's motivation of opposition 
and resentment of the civil rights movement spearheaded, at 
that time, by the NAACP. Moreover, in this regard, he ex-
hibited a consciousness of the historical context. 
also devotes much ot its tunds and energies to an 
extensive program of assisting certain kinds of 
litigation on behalf of its declared purposes.52 
52 
He claimed, therefore, "in the context of NAACP objectives, 
litigation is not a technique of resolving private differ-
ences," but rather, "a means for achieving the lawful ob-
jectives ot equality of treatment" by all levels of govern-
ment "for all rr,embers of the Negro community in this coun-
try. 1153 In other words, he concluded that it W'as a form of 
political expression. This litigation, according to him, 
made "possible the distinctive contribution of a minority 
group to the ideas and belie:t:s of our society. 1154 He pro-
claimed that there W'as no doubt that the tirst Amendment 
protects certain forms of orderly group activity. He con-
eluded that the NAACP's litigation definitely fell W'ithin 
that area of protection. 
ln Cousins y. ~igoda (1975), Brennan, speaking for 
the court, held that the National Democratic Party and its 
adherents enjoyed a constitutional right of ~litical as-
sociation under the Eirst Amendment. He W'rote: 
There can no longer oe any doubt the ireedom ot 
association with others for the common advancement 
ot political beliefs and ideas is a torm of 'or-
derly group activity' protected by the Eirst and 
52Hgtional Associgtion l"Or the Adv_gn~ent of Colored 
~le v-~~Q.Il, 83 s.ct. 328 (1963), p. 331. 
53~..LI P• 336. 
541-b. ~ 337 __ l.~, p. • 
Eourteenth Amendments. The right to associate 
with the political party of one's choice is an in-
tegral part of the basic constitutional freedom.SS 
53 
He argued that Illinois could show no compelling state in-
terest justifying its injunction against the seating of the 
~ro-Daley delegates at the National Democratic convention 
in 1972; 56 consequently, he declared that the injunction 
violated the rirst ~~endment's guarantee of freedom of as-
sociation. 
In Urod v. Bl.l.h:ll§ (1976), noncivil service employees 
of the cook county, Illinois, sheritt's office brought a 
class action suit alleging that they were fired or threat-
ened with dismissal for the sole reason that they were not 
affiliated with or sponsored oy the political party of the 
current sheriff. In a plurality opinion, Brennan held that 
the plaintiffs stated a valid claim for deprivation of con-
stitutional rights secured by the rirst P~endment. He ar-
gued that the practice ot patronage dismissals clearly in-
fringed the rirst Amendment rights ot noncivil service 
employees. He declared tnat the 1:)ractice was justitied 
only when the government could show that it turthered some 
governmental end. He declared that the Sheritt's office 
could not do so. 
sscou.sins v. wigo~, 95 s.ct. 541 (1975), p. 547. 
56An Illinois appellant court upheld a lower court's 
order preventing the 1972 Democratic convention from re-
placing certain delegates elected in conformity with Illi-
nois law, but in violation of a party rule forbidding 
slatemaking. 
54 
In sum, Brennan's approach in these cases reflect his 
beliet that the guarantee of tree expression fosters the 
values of democratic self-government. His means hinge on 
whether a form of expression is of "governing importance" 
or not. If it is, he has used an absolutist approach, and 
if it is not, he has employed a balancing test which, con-
sistent with his libertarianism, gives more weight to the 
individual's right or the public right to know vis-a-vis 
the governmental policy reasons for abridging it. Of the 
cases considered, his scale shifted in favor of the govern-
ment only twice. In ~llotti and hbood, it did so because 
of his view that corporate expenditures and organized la-
bor's use of fair share monies in connection with reterenda 
material suoverts the proper working of the political pro-
cess. In the next two chapters, I will examine Brennan's 
ettorts in two equally critical free expression areas: 
obscenity and libel. J:ourtherance of "self-governing" pow-




FREE EXPRESSION & OBSCENITY 
Prior to 1973, the Meiklejohnian influence was obvious 
in Brennan's opinions concerning the interrelationship be-
tween free expression and ooscenity laws. In these cases, 
he adopted and applied a "redeeming social value" test. 
This test was, as he admitted, a qualification of the 
"self-governing importance" test. In 1973, however, he re-
jected it, except in a narrow class of instances, in favor 
of a more absolutist approach. The breakdown of ethical 
consensus, in particular the "sexual revolution" of the 
1~60's and 1970's, is possibly an underlying factor in his 
rejection ot this test in the area of ooscenity. 
In a series of cases between 1957 and 1973, Brennan, 
by his own admission, unsuccessfully endeavored to formu-
late a comprehensive legal definition of obscenity and a 
statement of the interrelationship between free expression 
and obscenity laws. He laid the groundwork for this un-
satisfactory formula in the seminal case at Roth_y...__JJ:nited 
~tes (1957). At issue in Roth was the constitutionality 
of a long-standing federal statute which provided for post-
al censorship of obscene materials. Brennan, speaking for 
the court, held that the law did not violate the ldrst 
;Jnendment. He contended that "the unconditional phrasing 
of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every 
utterance. 111 He argued that "the protection given speech 
and press was fashioned to assure the unfettered inter-
56 
change of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
2 
social changes desired oy the people." Looking at the im-
plicit history of the First J4nendment, he determined that 
obscenity was rejected "as utterly without redeeming social 
importance. 113 He thus concluded that obscenity clearly 
tell outside the Jdrst .P.mendment • s area of protection. He 
then proceeded to formulate a legal detinition of ooscen-
ity. He avoided the overly-broad definition that sex and 
obscenity were necessarily synonymous. Rather, he defined 
obscene material as "material dealing with sex in a manner 
appealing to (the) prurient interests 114 of the average per-
son in the community. F·inally, he proclaimed that the test 
in each case, applying contemporary community standards, 
was "the effect of the .oook, picture or publication con-
' d 5 si ered as a whole." 
1~h v. unite.Q_.s_tat~, 77 s.ct. 1304 (1957) p. 1308. 
2 Ibig_._, f>• 1308. 
3 - . 130~. 1~1d11 p. 
4 Ibig, I p. 1310. 
5.lRi~. p. 1312. 
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In Kin.gsle~~oks, Inc. v. Bx.g~n (1957), the court 
upheld the constitutionality of a New York state statute 
permitting a temporary injunction at the instance of a 
municipal official, followed by a prompt trial at which, if 
the matter involved is held to be obscene, a permanent in-
junction against its possession or sale will be issued and 
the defendant ordered to surrender all copies to the sher-
iff tor destruction. Brennan, dissenting, held that the 
statute was inconsistent with ~ because it did not af-
ford the defendant a jury trial. He contended that the 
jury, representing a cross-section of the community, had "a 
special aptitude for reflecting the view of the average 
person. 116 He concluded, therefore, that it provided "a 
peculiarly competent application of the (Roth) standard ot 
judging obscenity, 117 
At issue in smith y, People ot__the state ot Cali_f ox::, 
ni.9 (1959) was whether a Los .Angeles obscenity law, dis-
pensing with the element of scienter (i.e., knowledge of 
the .book's contents) and imposing strict criminal liability 
on booksellers for possessing obscene material, violated 
the r'irst .Amendment. writing for the Court, Brennan con-
eluded that it did, tor it had a tendency to inhibit con-
stitutionally protected expression. He argued that it was 
6 . l Kin~~~~~~.&.....V• Brown, 77 s.ct. 1335 (1957) 
p. 1331. 
7 Ibi.Q .... , P• 1331, 
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impossible for a oookseller to inspect all tne oooks on his 
shelves to deterrr.ine whether they are ooscene or not. He 
thus declared that the ordinance's strict liability teature 
had the ettect 01 seriously depleting the nuffioer of non-
obscene oooks available on the oooksellers' shelves: there-
oy, restricting the public's access to constitutionally 
protected rEading matter. 
ln lv'1arcus y. Search 'harrants ot Prot.)erty, l::.tc.L. 
(1~61), the Court, through Brennan, neld that ~issouri's 
8 ~articular use ot the search and seizure t)Ower to su~.t?ress 
ooscene publications involved abuses inimical to protected 
expression. He asserted that the line net~een legitimate 
and illegi£imate speech was finely drawn, and as such 
called tor sensitive tools. He concluded that "rr;ass 
seizure in the tashion ot tnis case was etfected without 
any sareguards to ,,?rotect legitimate ex,t)ression. 119 
8A ~issouri law ~rovided that it a written corr.~laint 
is ffiade under oath to a judge or magistrate which states 
"positively and not upon intormation ot belief," or which 
states facts trom which the judge rinds "pronable cause" 
to believe, that ooscene material is being kept in a des-
ignated place, the judge shall issue a ~arrant directed 
to any police otticer to search the premises and "to seize 
and oring oetore such judge or ffiagistrate the personal 
~roperty therein described. 
9~!ilL.Yi~..[.£b._j@Ilants o:t Pr~rty, t.t~, 81 s. 
Ct. 1708 (1~61), p. 1719. A~proximately 11,000 copies of 
280 alleged ooscene publications were seized ~ursuant to 
a judge issued warrant. Two months later, a judge found 
that only 100 at the 280 publications were in fact obscene: 
thus, 180 nonobscene puolications, some of which were 
magazines saleaole only when current, were kept from the 
stands. 
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At issue in l!@nual ~nt&Xuri~~· Inc. v. D~ (1~62) was 
postal suppression of three magazines devoted primarily to 
portrayal of nude males. The court held that it violated 
the 1-irst Amendment. In a concurring opinion, Brennan dis-
posed of the case by announcing that the Postmaster General 
could not employ any process of his own to close the mails 
to material he considers obscene, for congress' Comstock 
Act9 did not confer such a power upon him. Moreover, re-
fleeting his general hostility to administrative censor-
ship, 10 he wrote: 
Congress could constitutionally authorize a non-
criminal process in the nature of a judicial pro-
ceeding under closely defined procedural safe-
guards. But the suggestion that Congress may con-
stitutionally authorize any process other than a 
fully judicial one immediately raises the gravest 
doubts.11 
In short, Brennan would declare unconstitutional any con-
gressional authorization of noncriminal administrative cen-
sorship. 
In 1~56, the Rhode Island legislature created a com-
mission to "Encourage Morality in Youth" with a generous 
mandate to educate the public on questions of obscene pub-
9Enacted in 1873, the Comstock Act made it a federal 
criminal offense to transport obscene materials through the 
mails. It authorized the Postmaster General to close the 
mails QD~ after a determination of obscenity had been made 
in a criminal prosecution of the sender. 
10 See pa~e 36, note 9, supra. 
11 l . ~ua ~nt~~ris~_.Inc. v.~. 82 s.ct. 1432 
(1962), p. 1453. 
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lications and to investigate and recommend prosecutions. 
In a continuing series of official letters, the Commission 
informed wholesale distributors that enumerated books and 
magazines had been declared by a majority Commission vote 
to be objectionable for sale, distribution, or display for 
youths under 18. Bantam Books, Inc. brought suit alleging 
that the commission's intimidating methods constituted a 
violation of its ~irst Amendment rights. In Jig~__!?ook.§..J. 
~ v. Sullivan (1~63), Brennan, speaking for the major-
ity, held that the Commission's activities, in an attempt 
to regulate obscene publications, inhibiteo the circulation 
of publications that fell within the tirst J:Jnendrnent's area 
of protection. "It is characteristic of the freedoms of 
expression in general," he claimed, "that they are vulner-
able to gravely damaging yet barely visible encroach-
ments." 12 He thus declared that "regulation of ooscenity 
••• must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks 1113 in 
order to ensure the larger principle of free expression. 
He concluded that the Commission's activities failed to 
erect such bulwarks, and as such violated the ~irst r~end-
ment. 
1212.sntam Book1.~.._JL.t_~ulliyan, 83 s.ct. 631 (1~63) 
p. 637. 
13 Ibid.._, p. 637. "Adequate bulwarks" for Brennan, 
consist of any means of regulating obscenity that does not 
infringe in any way upon legitimate forms of expression. 
His standard for adequacy was extremely high, particularly, 
for consenting adults. 
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~.bellis L_Ohi.Q (1964) grew out of a state crimi-
nal conviction for exhibiting an allegedly obscene movie, 
"Les Amants." In a plurality opinion, Brennan proclaimed 
that the issue of the proper standard for determining 
whether material is obscene "has oeen subject to much dis-
cussion and controversy since our decision in Roth seven 
years ago. 1114 He conceded that the Roth definition of ob-
scenity was imperfect, but reaffirmed nonetheless his com-
mitment to it for want of a more workable one. He then 
proceeded to clarify the meaning of the standard. He de-
clared that "a work cannot be prescribed unless it is 'ut-
l ' . h . l . ..1s ter y wit out socia importance. In addition, he clar-
ified the "prurient interest" test by adding a new ingredi-
ent--the deviation from society's standards of decency. 
He wrote: 
It should be recognized that the Roth standard 
requires in the first instance a finding that the 
material 'goes substantially beyond customary 
limits of such matter.•16 
F'urthermore, he contended that it was incorrect to read the 
14 bell; h' M:.gco ~~· o 10, 84 s.ct. 1676 (1964), p. 1680. 
This statement reflects the growing fragmentation within 
the Court over the issue of obscenity. 
151bid., p. 1680. The Court majority split on this 
point: thereby, accounting for the plurality. Black and 
Douglas stuck to their absolutist approach against regula-
tion of obscenity, thus removing the need to define it. 
On the other hand, Justice Potter Stewart clung to his vis-
ceral "I know it when I see it" test that defined obscenity 
simply as "hard-core pornography." 
16Ibid., p. 1680. 
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"contemporary community standard" aspect as requiring a de-
termination of obscenity by "the standards of the particu-
lar local community from which the case arises. 1117 Rather, 
he stated that the standard required a determination on the 
oasis of a national standard. "It is, atter all," he as-
serted, "a national constitution, we are expounding. 1118 
Relying on his clarification of the Roth standard, he held 
that the movie was not ooscene, tor it was not "utterly 
without social importance," and as such the conviction for 
showing it must be overturned. 
writing tne court opinion in A_Qygntity of Q2µies ot 
Books v. Kansas {1964), Brennan, drawing heavily upon 
M.g~, held that the procedures tallowed in issuing a war-
rant tor the seizure ot allegedly obscene books, and autho-
rizing their impounding pending a hearing, violated the 
.rirst Amendment because they did not adequately protect 
against the suppression of nonobscene books. "Constitu-
tionally protected expression," he declared, "is otten sep-
arated trorr. ooscenity by a dim and uncertain line. 111 :1 He 
proclaimed, therefore, that the 1'"'irst Amendment "requires 
a ~rocedure 'designed to focus searchingly on the issue of 
17 
'd 80 Ioi • , p. 16 • 
18 Ibi~~, p. 1682. 
19 t't . A_Qyan i y o{ Copies of Books~state of l<ansa~, 
84 s.ct. 1723 (1:164), p. 1726. 
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obscenity. 11120 
Brennan added a new element to his standard of deter-
mining obscenity in ~nzburg__y-L-Ynited ~tates (1~66). 
Speaking for the court, he declared that evidence of "pan-
dering in production and sale and publicity with respect to 
publications 1121 was relevant in determining the ultimate 
question of obscenity. "The question of obscenity," he 
wrote, "may include consideration of the setting in which 
the publications were presented as an aid to determining 
the question of obscenity. 1122 He asserted that, although 
the accused publications were not in themselves obscene, 
"exploitation of interests in tiitillation of pornography 
through pervasive treatment or desription of sexual matters 
may support the deterrnination 1123 to the contrary. He con-
eluded that Ginzburg's "sole emphasis was on the sexually 
t . t f h. l. . 1124 l provoca ive aspec s o is puo ication. Consequent y, 
he sustained Ginzburg's criminal conviction under the fed-
eral Comstock Act. 
20 n"; ~ 7 
.l!?h.._, p. 1 26. 
21 Among the evidence in the present case was the fact 
that Ginzburg had first sought mailing privileges for one 
of the publications from the post off ices in Intercourse 
and Blue Ball, Pennsylvania, and had later obtained them 
from the postmaster in Middlesex, New Jersey. 
22 . b . ~nz urg y. Unit~~tes, 86 s.ct. 942 (1966), 
pp. 44-45. 
23Ib'd 1 e I P• 950. 
24Ibig,, p. 947. 
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In Mishkin v. New Yor.k (1966), a companion case to 
Ginzbuxg, the court, through Brennan, applied the new no-
tion of pandering to sustain the conviction of a New York 
publisher for violating the state's obscenity law. Fur-
thermore, he clarified the "average person" facet of the 
HQ.:t.b "prurient interest" test. He wrote, the material must 
be assessed "in terms of the sexual interests of its in-
tended and probable recipient group. 1125 
11he Massachusetts supreme court held that U,~_jjill, 
the notorious eighteenth-century .book recounting a prosti-
tutes intimate sexual experiences, was obscene and thus 
subject to censorship. In A_liQok Lja~d "Jobn__~ilg~ 
commo~ll.b of fviassachusett.§ (1966), Brennan, speaking 
for a court majority, declared that the lower court's hold-
ing was erroneous. summarizing the development of his 
standard for determining obscenity, he ~rote: 
it must be established that (a) the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to 
a prurient interest in sex: (b) the material is 
patently offensive relating to the description or 
representation of sexual matters: and (c) the ma-
terial is utterly without redeeming social value. 26 
He declared that these three elements must coalesce in or-
der for a work to be declared obscene. He concluded that 
25 -• o"h1'k' lr ~&U!!An....:i.&....li~ Yoro' 86 S·. ct. 958 ( 1966) I p. 964. 
26A Book Named ~bn.....c.J:~nd's Mell12.ir§ of a Woman of 
Pleasure~__bj;torney Genexsl of the Commg.nwealth of Massa-
k.buset.t§, 86 s.ct. 975 (1966), p. 977. 
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the book, even though it failed when judged against the 
first two criteria, was not obscene oecause it was not 
without redeeming social value: at the very least, it had 
a modicum of literary and historical value. 
Ginsberg was convicted unoer a New York obscenity 
law27 for selling a sixteen-year-old .boy two "girlie maga-
zines containing pictures of female nudes. He petitioned 
the supreme court to overturn his conviction on the ground 
that the statute violated the i-·irst .hlllendment. In ~be..:g 
L. New York (1~68), Brennan, speaking for the court, denied 
Ginsberg• s petition, for the law did not violate tne r·irst 
rllllendment. conceding that the magazines were not obscene 
for adults, he contended, however, that the 6tate possesses 
the power to adjust the definition of obscenity for minors 
because it retains an inherent interest in their well-be-
ing. He concluded that the law's "definition of obscenity 
on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17 had a ration-
al relation to the objective of safeguarding such mi-
nors. 1128 
27 jrhe statute made it unlawful for any person to sell 
to minors under seventeen years of age any picture of sim-
ilar representation "which depicts nudity, sexual conduct, 
or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors," 
or any book or other printed matter which contains similar 
material "or explicit or detailed verbal descriptions or 
narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or 
sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a w·hole is harm-
ful to minors ... 
28 . h.OOY' ™~g_ v. New--:t2n, 88 s.ct. 1274 (1968) p. 1274. 
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Thomas I. Emerson sheds light on this delicate aspect 
ot the obscenity problem. He supports the ditferentiation 
between adults and minors vis-a-vis tne £irst Amendment. 
He asserts that the ~irst /Jnendment does not afford minors 
the full protection it does adults because they "(are) not 
permitted that measure of independence, or aole to exercise 
the maturity of judgment, which a system OL free expres-
. 29 h sion rests upon." F'or want of a better test, e recom-
mends a due process one--that the restriction oe a reason-
able one. He issued a caveat, however, that the restric-
tion pertaining to minors must not infringe upon an adult's 
first p~endment rights. 
By 1973, Brennan had oecome so frustrated in his en-
deavor to formulate a pertect definition of obscenity, that 
he denounced it outright as an exercise in futility. One 
,t)Ossible, underlying factor in his sudden a.oandonment of 
this endeavor was the fact that ethical consensus regard-
ing what constituted "obscene" was breaking down with the 
so-called "sexual revolution" of the 1~60's and 1970's. 
This revolution has led, in part, to greater discussion of 
sexual matters and practices which, in turn, has desensi-
tized many Pmericans to matters once considered obscene: 
there.by, making them nonobscene. In short, "obscene" has 
oecome increasingly a relative term requiring individual 
29 Thomas I. Emerson, The system ot Freedom of Expres-
§.i.Qn (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 496-497. 
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definitions of it, not a societal one. Perhaps reflecting 
this, Brennan simply came to the conclusion that the vexa-
tious line between obscenity and other sexually oriented 
but constitutionally protected expression was "too dim and 
too uncertain"; thereby, defying attempts to define it. 
Thus, he extricated himselt from this constitutional quag-
mire by moving toward, but not unconditionally embracing, 
the absolutist approach. 
This shift toward absolutism revealed itself, for the 
first time, in his dissenting opinion in ~A-Adult The-
atre Iv. Slaton (1973), a companion case to Miller v. 
~for.nig (1973). In Mill~, a Burger court majority re-
shuffled the previously laid-down cards, many of which came 
from Brennan's hand, concerning the regulation of obscen-
ity. The majority reaffirmed the Roth principle that ob-
sceni ty is not afforded E·irst P.Jnendrnent protection, reject-
ed the Mero~ "utterly without redeeming social value" 
test, and adopted Justice John Marshall Harlan's earlier 
view that in determining whether a work is ooscene courts 
may apply state standards of candor and offensiveness 
rather than national ones. In capsulized torm, Burger 
wrote: 
A finding of obscenity will now turn on (a) 
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards' would find the work taken as 
a whole, appealing to prurient interests; (b) 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a pat-
ently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) 
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientitic val-
ue.30 
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Brennan's dissent in ~Q.ll covered both cases. In a 
remarkably frank confession, he announced that "our experi-
ence with the Rotb approach has certainly taugnt us that 
the outright suppression o:t ooscenity cannot be reconciled 
1#ith the tundamental principle ot the ~irst Amendment. 1131 
He wrote: 
Atter 16 years of experimentation and debate, I 
am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that none 
of the available formulas, including the one an-
nounced today (in hilJ&~), can reduce the vagueness 
to a tolerable level ~hile at the same time strik-
ing an acceptable balance oetween protection of 
the l:.'irst and :Fourteenth ~Jnendments, on the one 
hand, and on the other the asserted state interest 
in regulating the dissemination of certain sexual-
ly oriented materials.32 
He asserted that "the concept ot 'ooscenity' cannot oe de-
fined with sutf icient specificity and clarity * * * to 
~revent su.ostantial erosion of protected speech. 1133 con-
trary to the absolutist approach, he stuck to his view 
that the government may suppress "sexually oriented mater-
ials on the basis ot their allegedly 'ooscene' contents" in 
instances involving "distrioution to juveniles and ootru9!0 
30
Millfil.....Y.&....Cal.itorny, 93 s.ct. 2607 (1~73). 
3~is Adu.l..t._~tre I v. Slaton, 93 s.ct, 2628 
(1973), p. 2647. 
32 Ibi~, p. 2647. 
33 Ibis;b_, p. 2657. 
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sive exposure to unconsenting adults. 1134 But in all other 
instances, he concluded "the rirst and Fourteenth Amend-
ments prohibit the state and F'ederal Government from at-
" . l 35 terr~pting wholly to suppress such materia s. 
In the early afternoon of October 30, 1~73, a ~ew 
York City radio station {WBAI) licensed to the Pacitica 
:toundation broadcast a prerecorded monologue oy the come-
dian George Carlin as part of a discussion of contemporary 
attitudes toward language. 1rhe monologue, entitled "F'ilthy 
words," repeated a variety of colloquialisffis or seven words 
which Carlin quipped could never be said on puolic air-
waves. Just before airing the skit, the ~rogram's host 
advised listeners that the record contained "sensitive lan-
guage which might be regarded as offensive to some." Five 
weeks later, the Federal Communications Commission received 
a complaint aoout the program trom a listener who had heard 
the oroadcast while driving with his tifteen-year-old son. 
The ~cc thereafter issued an order oanning future broad-
casting of the monologue because ot its use of indecent 
341bid., p. 2662. This qualification separates 
Brennan from the absolutists such as Black and Douglas. 
~oreover, this qualification concurs with ~merson's theory 
on the proolern ot ooscenity. see Emerson, pp. 502-503: 
0 Dissernination of erotic materials to those who voluntarily 
choose to read or see them would be protected under the 
Eirst ~.mendment. Forcing such material upon individuals 
who did not want them, or did not want their children to 
have them, or upon the public at large, would .be prohibit-
aole." 
35 
.. d 2 2 ll21r,g.L , p. 6 6 • 
70 
.f'.Qlll}Q.9tion (1978), the supreme court, through Justice 
Stevens, upheld the FCC's order. Brennan f.iled a vigorous 
and passionate dissent. He wrote: 
I find the court's misapplication of fundamental 
t·irst Amendment principles so patent, and its at-
tempt to impose its notion ot propriety on the 
whole of the American people so misguided that I 
am unable to remain silent.36 
He argued that acceptable words or expression vary accord-
ing to ditfering socio-economic backgrounds. In this con-
text, he viewed the court's decision as "another of tne 
dominant culture's inevitable efforts to force those groups 
who do not share its mores to conform to its way 01 think-
. t' k' 37 ing , ac ing , and s pea ing. 11 He concluded tnat this 
"acute ethnocentricism, 11 in effect, inhibited those broad-
casters desiring to reach those people who were not members 
of the dominant culture. He agreed wholeheartedly with the 
Court's contention that the Bill of Rights guaranteed "an 
individual's right 'to be let alone' when engaged in pri-
vate activity within the confines of his own home. 1138 He 
36f:§~ral Commynication~ommisaion y. Paci,ti.sa._Eoun-
dation, 98 s.ct. 3026 (1978}, p. 3047. 
37l,&>id., p. 3055. His abhorence of forced cultural 
conformity is a statement of his idealistic vision of lib-
eralism. Moreover, it may derive, in part, from the break-
down of ethical consensus (i.e., the movement toward ethi-
cal relativism). 
38 . ;~ ~~. p. 3048. 
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argu~d, however, that "the radio is undenia.bly a public 
medium" which does not "implicate tundamental privacy in-
terests.1139 Listening to the radio, according to him, is a 
. voluntary act to partake in an ongoing public discourse. 
since it is voluntary, he declared, the individual can 
change the channel or turn it off, if. the discourse is 
found to be offensive. In other words, he .believes that a 
radio broadcast can never constitute an "obtrusive exposure 
to an unconsenting adult." 
In NewJ.QXk v.J.§~X (1~82), the court unanimously 
upheld a New York criminal statute oanning the distribu-
tion of nono.bscene material depicting sexual conduct by 
cnildren. The case grew out ot the 1~78 criminal convic-
tion of Paul Ferber, the proprietor ot a Manhattan book-
store specializing in sexually oriented products, for sell-
ing t~o films devoted almost exclusively to depicting young 
boys masturoating, to an undercover police otficer. In a 
concurring opinion, Brennan clung to his "view (expressed 
in Slaton) that, in the absence ot exposure, or particular 
harm to juveniles or unconsenting adults that state lacks 
power to suppress sexually oriented materials. 1140 since 
the case brought one of his excepting criteria-particular 
harm to juveniles-into play, he applied the "utterly with-
39 ~ ... , p. 3048. 
40New York_y_,__~rbe~, 102 s.ct. 3348 (1982), p. 
3365. 
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out social value" test. Consi~ering the harm to juveniles 
posed by the production and distribution ot the films, he 
claimed that their "tiny traction" of "serious literary, 
artistic, scientific, or medical value" did not justify 
striking oown the statute. 
In sum, Brennan initially relied upon the "redeeming 
social value" test in obscenity cases. Later, perhaps 
tueled partly oy the oreakdown of ethical consensus, he re-
jected it, except in a narrow class of instances, in tavor 
of a more aosolutist approach oecause the line .bet'tVeen ob-
scene and legitimate expression defies clear definition. 
Underlying this rejection is his condemnation of selt-cen-
sorship deriving from official action that "creates a zone 
of uncertainty into which only the hardiest, not necessar-
ily wisest, will dare to enter for fear of crossing the 
ooundary from licit to illicit speech. 041 In addition, 
the tact that obscene expression neither advances or re-
tards the citizenry's self-governing powers is a critical 
factor behind this rejection. Conversely, libelous expres-
sion is not neutral. Thus, Brennan has continued to rely 
upon the "social value test" in libel cases. rv1oreover, his 
distaste of self-censorship is particularly evinced in 
these cases. In the next chapter, I intend to examine his 
efforts in this area. 
41 Arthur J. Goldberg, "Mr. Justice Brennan and the 
:t·irst Amendment," Rutgers-Camden Law Journal, 4 (Fall, 
1~72), p. 12. 
CHAPTER VI 
FIRST AMENDMENT/ 
FREE EXPRESSION & LIBEL 
In 1964, Brennan embarked on his attempt to formulate 
a standard defining the interrelationship bet~een the ~irst 
Amendment and libel laws. New Yo~ Times v. sull~n 
( 1964) is the seminal case. 'rhe case required the court 
to determine for the first time the extent to which the 
constitutional protections for speech and press limit a 
state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by 
a public official against critics of his official conduct. 
It had its origin in an advertisement published in ~~ 
~rk Tirn!i§ charging the police and city commissioners ot 
Montgomery, Alabama, with instituting an "unprecedented 
wave of terror" in their attempt to suppress various deseg-
regation activities. Significantly, several of the state-
ments in the advertisement were erroneous, at least in de-
tail, and a Montgomery city commissioner had promptly sued 
the newspaper for libel. Brennan, writing for an unanimous 
court, contended that the case must be considered "against 
the background of a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should uninhibited, 
74 
robust, and wide-open."1 He further contended that public 
debate "may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public off i-
cials. "2 "Erroneo~s statement is inevitable in free de-
bate," he wrote, consequently, "it must be protected if the 
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' 
that they 'need * * *to survive. 113 He argued, however, 
that the :r·irst Amendment did not protect all erroneous 
statements. An erroneous statement that was libelous, ac-
cording to him, fell outside the area of protected expres-
sion. He defined a libelous statement as one made "with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not." He concluded that the defen-
dant's claim of libel was unjustified, for he failed to 
show "actual malice" on the part of the publisher. 
A district attorney's conviction under the Louisiana 
Criminal Defamation statute for remarks critical of judges 
in his district initiated the case of ~...:isQn-Y.s.._l..,Quis~ 
(1964). Brennan, speaking for the court, held that the 
~~--i:Qx!L~~~ rule limited state power to impose criminal 
sanctions for criticism of the official conduct of public 
officials. He asserted that debate on public issues must 
1~XQ.:&._Times v~~livan, 84 s.ct. 710 (1964), 
p. 721. 
2Ibid., p. 721. 
31bid., p. 721. 
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be uninhibited, and that "utterances honestly believed" 
must be protected because they "contribute to the free in-
terchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth. 114 He 
contended that just because "speech is used as a tool for 
political ends does not automatically bring it under the 
mantle of the constitution." 5 "The knowingly false state-
ment and the false statement made with reckless disregard 
of the truth," he proclaimed, "do not enjoy constitutional 
protection. 116 He wrote: 
Calculated falsehood falls into that class of 
utterances which 'are no essential part of any ex-
position of ideas, and of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.7 
The origin of Ros~att y~~ (1966) was a news-
paper columnist's criticism of the operation of a state 
recreation center and ski resort of which Baer had been 
supervisor. Baer brought suit tor libel, alleging the col-
urnn had imputed mismanagement and peculation to him. In a 
plurality opinion, Brennan declared that the ~lL.XQ.;"k....tim~ 
rule applied "to those among the hierarchy of government 
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, sub-
stantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of 
4 . . . ~ison JU_Louisiana, 85 S.Ct. 209 (1964), p. 215. 
5Ibid., p. 216. 
61bid., p. 216. 
7 ll?is!.a. I P• 216 • 
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governmental affairs." He argued that in the field of 
libel, "there must be evidence showing that the attack was 
read specif.ically directed at the plaintiff. 118 He contend-
ed that "criticism of government is at the very center of 
the constitutionally protected area of free discussion. 119 
He concluded that "criticism of those responsible for gov-
ernrnent operations must be free, lest criticism of govern-
ment itself be penalized."lO 
In ~~~.._yi_Hill (1967), Brennan, speaking for 
the Court, ruled that the New Xo~k Time4 standard applied 
to a privacy suit. The case grew out of the publication by 
~ magazine of a series of pictures taken from a play 
that portrayed in fictionalized fashion an incident in 
which escaped convicts had invaded the Hill home and held 
the members of the family captiv~ for nineteen hours. The 
~ story identified the play as based originally on the 
Hill family's experience, but failed to make clear its fie-
tionalized character. Even though the ~ story contained 
nothing libelous or disgraceful in any way concerning 
the Hill family, Hill nonetheless promptly sued the pub-
lishers of the magazine for invasion of his privacy under 
a New York Civil Code forbidding such invasions for commer-
8 Rosenbl1tt v~~. 86 s.ct. 669 (1966), p. 542. 
9 1biQ..., p. 676. 
lOibid,, p. 676. 
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cial purposes. Brennan argued that "the exposure of self 
to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in 
. ·1· d •t 1111 a civi ize comrnuni y. He further argued that this was 
particularly so "in a society which places a primary value 
on freedom of speech and of press. 1112 He concluded: 
we create a grave risk of serious impairment of 
the indispensable service of a free press in a 
free society if we saddle the press with the im-
possible burden of verifying to a certainty the 
facts associated in news articles with a person•s 
name, picture or portrait, particularly as related 
to non-defamatory matter.13 
HiJJ.. is an illuminating case, for it brought about a 
conflict between two libertarian values---f ree expression 
d . 14 an privacy. Brennan believes that the former, echoing 
the Neiklejohnian interpretation, is "the essence of demo-
cratic self-government," and that the latter is an implicit 
right secured by the Bill of Rights. 15 while both are 
11TimeL Inc, v, Hill, 87 s.ct. 534 (1967), ~- 542. 
12Ibid,, p. 542, 
13Ibid,, p. 542. 
14As pointed out earlier, Brennan's Bill of Rights 
efforts are motivated by either his desire for democratic 
self-government, or his respect for personal privacy. 
151n Griswold ~_connecticut (1965), the court es-
tablished a new constitutional "right to privacy." 
Brennan joined in Douglas' majority opinion. Therein, 
Douglas wrote, "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees 
that help give them life and substance. such penumbras 
guaranteeing zones of privacy for the individual lie around 
the guarantees of the ~·irst, 1''ourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments as protection against all governmental inva-
sions of the sanctity of a man's house." 
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precious, the former is more so. Indeed, tor Brennan, free 
expression is the most precious of all the Bill of Rights' 
guarantees. 
In RQsenoloom v. Metromedia, Inc. (1~71), Brennan 
took a significant step toward the absolute immunization 
of the news media from libel judgments. The case present-
ed the question whether the New York TimJi§ knowing-or-reek-
less-falsity rule was applicable in a state civil lioel 
action brought by a private individual for an erroneous 
statement uttered in a news broadcast by a radio station. 
In a plurality opinion, Brennan held that it did apply. He 
argued that "drawing a distinction between 'public' and 
'private' figures makes no sense in terms ot the First 
.Amendment guarantees. 1116 Instead, he claimed that a dis-
tinction between events of public concern and those not of 
public concern was a more meaningful one, for it considers 
both the public's need to know and the individual's inter-
est in privacy. He contended that "voluntary or not, we 
are all 'public' men to some degree." 17 He concluded that 
"we honor the commitment to robust debate on pu.blic issues 
* * * by extending constitutional protection to all discus-
sion and communication involving matters of public or gen-
er a.l concern. 1118 
16Rosen.bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., ~1 S.Ct. 1811 
(1971), p. 1821. 
17Ib'd J. • ' p. 1822. 
18Ibida_, P• 1820. 
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In Gertz Y..s.._Robert belch, Inc. (1974), the Court 
overturned Brennan's decision in Rosenb.l&Qm with respect to 
dra"Wing a distinction between "public and private" figures. 
In a dissenting opinion, Brennan reaffirmed his commitment 
to Rosenbloom. He wrote: 
~e strike the proper accommodation between 
avoidance of media self-censorship and protection 
of individual reputations only when we require 
states to apply the New York Times knowing-or-
reckless-f alsity standard in civil libel actions 
concerning media reports of the involvement of 
private individuals in events of public or general 
interest.19 
In rebruary 1973, the CBS documentary program "Sixty 
£¥iinutes" carried a segment entitled "The Selling of colonel 
Herbert," narrated by .fviike wallace and produced and direct-
ed by Barry Lando. Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Herbert, a 
war hero suddenly relieved of his battalion command in 
Vietnam, had publicly accused his superior otficers ot 
covering up American atrocities. The broadcast segment 
juxtaposed filmclips of Wallace's interviews with Herbert 
and his detractors in a manner casting doubts on Herbert's 
accusations. Herbert promptly sued Lando, ~allace, and CBS 
for libel. In ~~ert..,JU.~~ (1979), Brennan agreed with 
the majority's rejection of respondents' claim that an 
"editorial privilege" shields from discovery information 
that would reveal respondents' editorial process. He di-
!~Gertz v, Robert Welch, Inc.&., 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974), 
p. 1821. 
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verged from it, however, oy holding that "the :rirst Amend-
ment requires predecisional communication among editors to 
b d . . l . · 1 .. 20 h . . . l e protected by an e itoria privi ege. Tis privi ege. 
must yield, he conceded, when "a t)Ublic tigure plaintiff 
is able to demonstrate to the prima-f acie satisfaction of 
a tri~l judge that the libel in question constituted de-
f amatory talsehood. 1121 He asserted that the :tounding 
F'athers valued liberty both as an end and as a means. "In 
its instrumental aspect," he proclaimed, "the First Amend-
ment serves to foster the values of democratic selt-govern-
ment. 1122 He declared that "it is a great mistake to under-
stand this aspect of the Eirst Amendment solely through the 
filter of individual rights. 1123 In short, he concluded: 
An editorial privilege would thus not be merely 
personal to respondents, but would shield the press 
in its function 'as agents of the public at large.' 
The press is the necessary representative of the 
public's interest in this context and the instru-
mentality which effects the public's right.24 
Brennan's statement that the r·irst Amendment's in-
strumental aspect is understood best through more than the 
filter of individual rights is certainly a striking one. 
ror him, the F'irst Amendment does more than confer individ-
20 ~l;!grt y. Lando, 99 s.ct. 1635 (1979), p. 1651. 
21T"h;~ ~.... , p. 1651. 
22n,; ~ ~~' p. 1653. 
importance" reflects his 
interpretation. 
23 Ibid,, p, 1654, 
24Ibid,, p. 1656, 
Speaking in terms of "governing 
commitment to the Meiklejohnian 
ual rights. In its instrumental aspect, it protects both 
the individual's right to speak and the public's right to 
know. 'I'he public• s right to know is the oasis of his ap-
proach in libel cases. Indeed, in this area, he attaches 
more importance to this right than the individual's right 
to speak. Of course at times, the two rights mirror one 
another. As Tribe asserts, however, 
the right to know at times means more: it may 
include an individual's right to acquire desired 
information or ideas free of governmental veto, 
undue hinderance, or unwarranted exposure. such 
a right to know may entail no correlative right 
in any particular source to originate the comrnun-
ications. 25 
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Moreover, this statement echoes the Meiklejohnian interpre-
tation. Brennan wrote, "(t)hese powers which (Meiklejohn) 
labelled powers of 'governing importance,' are concerned, 
not with a private right, but with a public power, a gov-
ernmental responsibility. 1126 
In sum, Brennan continues to adhere to a "redeeming 
social value" test in the area of libel. He does so 
because he believes that calculated falsehoods or a wanton 
disregard for the truth, works to the detriment of demo~ 
cratic self-government. Indeed, he thinks that they could 
lead to its downfall. Of interest in the cases considered, 
however, is the fact that he did not sustain a single libel 
25Tribe, pp. 675-676. 
26
srennan, "The Meiklejohn Interpretation," p. 12. 
judgment. Thus, though his approach in this area is not 
absolute, his results tend to be. 
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'rhe Meiklejohn interpretation of the 1::•irst Amendment 
is the skeletal framework of Brennan's free expression ap-
proach. Like Meiklejohn, he believes that the rirst Amend-
ment absolutely protects expression of "governing impor-
tance." Over the years, he has fleshed out this skeleton 
by bringing expression of "social value" into the contours 
of this absolute protection. This tleshing out process 
~as tueled partly by the breakdown of ethical consensus, 
and by the increasing absolutism in the scholarly studies 
he has relied u,t.X>n such as the \Writings of Emerson and 
Tribe. ~merson's influence is clearly evidenced in the 
area of obscenity. 
CHAPTER VII 
f OURI'H J.:JVlENLMENT 
American criminal procedure is outlined in the Fourth, 
Fifth, and sixth Amendments. The conceptual nasis for 
Brennan's efforts in this area is threefold: (1) a deep 
commitment to the values of individual liberty as embodied 
in the right of personal privacy1 and human dignity: (2) 
the value of a neutral and detached magistrate2 : and (3) 
the spectre of "police state" activity and an indignation 
at the police cutting corners. over the years, Brennan's 
approach in this area has become increasingly rigid and ab-
solute in tavor of the individual. A number of factors 
underly this movement. One, prior to his appointment to 
the supreme Court, Brennan had shown an interest in, and 
indeed had advocated more enlightened criminal and 
trial procedures. 3 This interest carried over to his ef-
forts in the area of criminal procedure. Two, the change 
01· guard between 1969 and 1~75, from the libertarian Warren 
Court to the law-and-order Burger court is a pronounced 
1 
see page 77, note 15, supra. 
2 Stephen J. F'riedman, "Mr. Justice Brennan: 'I'he 
F·irst Decade," ~vard~_B.§y:ie)!, 80 {November, 1966) , 
p. 7. 
3 See page 1, note 2, supra. 
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factor. It is reflected in the fact than many of Brennan's 
most passionate libertarian opinions are direct reactions 
to the Burger court's law-and-order stance. lfinally, the 
breakdown of ethical consensus to the extent that it "stim-
4 
ulated a concern with personal values" may have somehow 
influenced Brennan to give greater emphasis to the protec-
tion of individual liberties against governmental intru-
sions. In the next three chapters, I will examine his 
criminal procedure opinions. 
'l.1he Fourth £..mendment does not forbid all searches and 
seizures, but only unreasonable ones. 1rhus, the operative 
word in F'ourth Amendment cases is "unreasonable." Brennan 
believes that it absolutely bans all unreasonable searches 
and seizures. He holds, furthermore, that the exclusionary 
rule is part and parcel of it, and as such it bars the use 
of evidence obtained through unreasonable means in court. 5 
Paying strict attention to the contextual reality in each 
case, he balances the individual's proposed F'ourth Amend-
ment right against the policy reasons advanced by the gov-
ernment in order to ascertain whether the search in ques-
tion is reasonable. Consistent with his liberalism, his 
4 h' t t . . w i e, ~r Law in-&Qe~, p. 213. 
5~veryone does not agree with him on this point. In 
fact, conservative, law-and-order Justices such as Powell 
and Rehnquist believe otherwise. Valuing community stabil-
ity and order, they contend that the rourth ~.mendment does 
not necessarily forbid the use of illegally obtained evi-
dence at trial. see United~~es v. Calandra, 94 s.ct. 
613 (1974) and United states...JU.......f§.ltier, 95 s.ct. 2313 
(1975). 
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balance gives more weight to the individual's right to pri-
vacy. Indeed, over the years, he has tipped this scale in-
creasingly in favor of the individual. Thus, in most cases 
he has determined that the search is unreasonable, and thus 
has decided in favor of the individual. 
concluding that it could not prosecute Aoel, a sus-
pected spy, the federal Bureau of Investigation informed 
the Immigration and Naturalization service that he was an 
illegal alien. Upon investigation, the Service found that 
he was subject to deportation, and arrested him. Following 
his arrest, the FBI, pursuant to the Hotel's permission, 
searched Abel's former room and seized a hollow pencil con-
taining a "cipher pad." Later, Abel was brought to trial 
and convicted for conspiracy to commit espionage. His 
motion to suppress the ~BI seized evidence on tourth Amend-
rnent grounds was denied. In ~J......y-£-_Jlni~d States (1960), 
the supreme court, denied his motion and upheld his convic-
tion. Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, held that the 
search and seizure violated the Fourth PJnendment, for it 
concentrated too much power in the hands of the executive 
branch. "The progress is too easy from police action un-
scrutinized by judicial authorization to the police state," 
he wrote, "and where a species of arrest is available that 
is subject to no judicial control, the possibilities become 
d . ,6 more an more serious.' Although the case was a notorious 
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one involving a notorious defendant previously engaged in 
espionage, he proclaimed that "the (Eourth) Amendment's 
protection is made effective for everyone only by upholding 
it when invoked by the worst men. 117 He contended that the 
F·ourth Amendment imposed substantive standards for searches 
and seizures. Critical among these standards, he asserted, 
was "independent (judicial) control over the actions of of-
ficers effecting searches of private premises. 118 He con-
eluded that the warrantless search of Pl>el's premises com-
pletely removed this independent judicial control. 
At issue in ooth Elkins v. United states (1960) and 
~-Y... Oh.i2 ( 1961.) was the relationship bet1-Ween the Fourth 
Amendment and the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule 
holds that evidence obtained through unreasonable or ille-
gal means can not be introduced in court. In Elkins, the 
court held that evidence of a federal crime illegally 
seized by state agents and turned over to federal agents on 
a "silver platter" is not admissible in a federal criminal 
proceeding. The Court, however, left the door open to the 
admissibility of such evidence in a state criminal proceed-
ing. It closed the door in ~· Justice Tom c. Clark, 
speaking for the court, declared that common sense dictated 
that the exclusionary rule was part and parcel of the 
7 b' I id. I p. 702. 
8 1bid 1 , p. 704. 
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E'ourth Amendment, and that it was applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth's Due Process Clause. Brennan 
joined in t>Oth majority opinions. 
The question presented in Wong_Sun v. United States 
(1963) was whether verbal evidence derived from an illegal 
search and seizure was admissible at trial. Brennan, 
speaking for the court, held that it was not admissible 
under the Fourth Amendment. "Verbal evidence which derives 
so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized 
arrest as the officers' action in the present case," he ar-
gued, "is no less the 'fruit' of official illegality than 
the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intru-
sion. 119 He further argued that "nor do the policies under-
lying the exclusionary rule invite any logical distinction 
between physical and verbal evidence. 1110 He concluded 
that since the verbal evidence was obtained through illegal 
police actions, it must be excluded from court considera-
tion. 
At issue in Lowez v. United state§ (1~63) was the ad-
missibility as evidence of an internal revenue agent's se-
cret tape recording of a conversation between himself and 
Lopez in which Lopez had offered him a bribe in connection 
with a cabaret tax delinquency. The Supreme Court, speak-
9
.hQnQ Sun ~_ynited States, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963), 
p. 416. 
lOibid.._, p. 416. 
88 
ing through Justice Harlan, held that the recording ~as ad-
missiole as evidence. Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, 
ruled that it was inadmissible, for it violated the Fourth 
Hnendment. "In a free society," he argued, "people ought 
11 
not to have to watch their every word so carefully." He 
wrote, "I believe that there is a grave danger of chilling 
all private, free, and unconstrained communication if se-
cret recordings 1112 as in the present case are judged to be 
admissible as evidence. He claimed that history and the 
content of the constitution pointed to the true ~ath to the 
answer of the question whether "the fruits of surreptious 
electronic surveillance" fell within the Fourth Amendment's 
regulatory area. Looking at these tactors, he concluded 
that it did. He asserted that "the government ought not 
to have the untrammeled right to extract evidence from 
people. 1113 He contended that surreptious electronic sur-
veillance violated the "informing principles" of both the 
Fourth and Fifth J.Jnendments: "the comprehensive right of 
personal liberty in the face of governmental intrusion. 1114 
Police officers lost the trail of a man driving a car 
llr.o,~z v_._ . t ~ ~----:..---~u~n~i-=-=e . M.....state4, 83 s.ct. 1381 (1~63), 
p. 1395. 
12Ibid,, p. 1395. 
13 . 
.!Qid., p. 1396. 
14Ibid., p. 13~6. •rhese "informing principles" are 
synonymous with his key notion of personal privacy and hu-
man dignity. 
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they had observed participate in a transaction resembling 
a purchase of marijuana when he made a u-turn. Upon learn-
ing that Ker, the car's registered owner, was a known drug 
offender, the officers drove to his domicile. Gaining a 
15 noiseless entry with a key obtained from the apartment 
building manager, they observed what appeared to be a pack-
age of marijuana in the kitchen and arrested Ker and his 
wife for possession of narcotics in violation of the Cali-
fornia Health and Safety Code. In Ker v. state of Califor-
nia (1963), the Court held that under the circumstances in-
eluding showing that arresting officers had observed Ker, a 
known drug user, contact a known marijuana dealer prior to 
driving to Ker's apartment, and that marijuana was in plain 
sight, which made it obvious to arresting officers, even 
before they started to search, that occupants were in pro-
cess of commiting felony of possession of marijuana, arrest 
of occupants without warrants was valid, and the evidence 
seized was constitutionally admissible. Brennan dissented. 
He declared that the unannounced intrusion violated the 
Fourth i-Jllendment. He argue<i that the :r-ourth ,t:Jnendment • s 
protections of individual freedom "undoubtedly included 
this * * * requirement of an announcement by police offi-
cers of purpose and authority before breaking into an in-
15As opposed to the traditional talisman of "Open the 
door in the name of the law." 
dividual's home. 1116 He further argued that "the require-
rnent is no mere procedural nicety or formality attendant 
17 
upon the service of a warrant." He conceded that there 
was a narrow class of exceptions: 
(1) where the persons within already know of the 
officers' authority and purpose, or (2) where the 
officers are justified in the belief that persons 
within are in imminent peril or bodily harm, or (3) 
where those within, made aware of the presence of 
someone outside are then engaged in activity which 
justifies the OLf icers in the oelief that an escape 
or the destruction of evidence is being attempt-
ed.18 
He concluded that this unannouced intrusion did not meet 
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any of the excepting criteria. f·urthermore, he contended 
that the practical hazards of "mistaken identity" or of the 
"officers' dangerous calling" militated against expanding 
the number of exceptions. 
whereas Brennan condemned the police officers' intru-
sion in ~, he sanctioned their actions in the cases of 
~~ber_y..s.,...J;.aJ:ifornia (1966) and Hgx.Q§ll.L Maryland Peni-
ten,ti.ary v. Hayden (1967), for the warrantless searches in 
both met his excepting criteria of "ensuring the safety of 
arresting officers and the security of the arrest against 
the prisoner's {or evidence's) escape." .Moreover, these 
cases reflect his "willingness to concede the legitimate 
16 ~ v. state of California, 83 s.ct. 1623 (1963), 
p. 1637. 
17
..ll2iQi, p. 1637. 
181bidL1 P• 1636. 
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needs of the police as protectors of the social order. 1119 
. t' 20 In ~hrnerber, Brennan, joined by the four conserva ives, 
held that the taking of schrnerber's blood, pursuant to a 
police officer's request, at the hospital against his will 
for the express purpose of determining whether he had been 
driving while intoxicated following an accident in which 
he had sustained injuries did not violate his right under 
the Fourth Amendment to be free of unreasonaole searches 
and seizures. He contended that "the overriding function 
of the ~ourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and 
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State. 1121 
22 Given the special facts of the case, he argued that "the 
attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol-content * * * 
was an appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest 1123 for 
drunken driving. Citing the number of traffic fatalities 
due to drunken drivers, 24 he proclaimed that the state had 
19 Heck, pp. 866-867. 
20Justices Torn c. Clark, Byron R. White, Potter 
Stewart, and John Marshall Harlan. 
21c~"h"' b .,,,.1 ;f . , ~~Y.t.~~ ornia, 86 s.ct. 1826 (1966), p. 
1834. Indeed, one of the central notions of Brennan's lib-
eralism is this protection of personal privacy and human 
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the state. 'l'his 
notion carries over to his approach in Bill of Rights 
cases. 
22 1 . l h n particu ar, t e facts that the blood was with-
drawn in a hosptial by a doctor and that alcohol absorbed 
in the blood quickly dissipates. 
23Ibi~, p. 1836. 
24For Brennan this alarming number justified shifting 
the balance in favor of governmental intrusion. 
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a legitimate interest in keeping them off the roads. He 
claimed that "there was plainly probable cause for the of-
ficer to arrest petitioner and charge him with driving an 
automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liq-
uor. 1125 He cautioned, however, that the holding was limit-
ed only to the facts of the present case. 
This opinion certainly is not a libertarian one. In 
fact, Brennan's liberal 8rethen warren, Black, DOuglas, and 
Fortas dissented from it. But it is a pragmatic one. This 
fact answers the question why Brennan, the liberal, took 
such a conservative stance. He was alarmed by the number 
of needless traffic fatalities due to drunk drivers. con-
sequently, he subtly balanced away schmerber's right to 
privacy--the taking of one's blood against his will clear-
ly cuts to the heart of privacy--in favor of the safety of 
society's highways. Edward v. Heck wrote: "convinced that 
society's interest in protection from drunken drivers re-
quired limited restriction on individual liberty, Brennan 
did indeed engage in a 'refined, subtle reasoning and bal-
ancing process. 11126 Also, the concept of "ordered liberty" 
is reflected in the opinion. consistent with the label of 
"pragmatic liberalism," Brennan wrote, "without 'order' 
25 Sch~~. p. 1645. schmerber was visibly drunk. 
26 Heck, p. 868. 
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there i. s no 'li' -...... ..,,,.rty. ' 1127 I thi' o der i· s ne es ry ~ n s case, r c sa 
to insure the safety of the highways and the greatest lib-
erty of all: life itself. 
H9.yden had its origin in police officers' entrance 
into a house and s~arch and seizure therein without a war-
rant of clothing--a cap, jacket, and pants--matching de-
scription of those worn by an armed robber who police had 
trailed there in "hot pursuit." Considering the circum-
stances of the case, 28 Brennan, joined once again by the 
four conservatives, 29 held that the warrantless search and 
seizure ¥Jas reasonable. He contended that "the Fourth 
r:.mendment does not require police officers to delay in the 
course of an investigation if to do so would gravely en-
danger their lives or the lives of others. 1130 He concluded 
that "'the exigencies of the situation made the course im-
perative. •1131 He wrote: 
Speed here was essential, and only a thorough 
search of the house for persons and weapons could 
have insured that Hayden was the only man present 
27 
william J. Brennan, Jr., "Ordered Liberty: ·rhe 
Beginning Lawyer's Challenge," ~lich~tat~~Q.Y~, 
42 {April, 1963), p. 14. 
281 . l h f h h h . n particu ar, t e act t at t e searc and seizure 
was incident to a "hot pursuit." 
29 . Justices Black, Warren, and Fortas concurred, while 
Douglas dissented. 
30 ~en. M~~and P~enti~r~ v. H~n. 87 s.ct. 
1642 (1967), p. 1646. 
31 b'd I i, ' P• 1645. 
and that the police had control of all weapons 
which could be used against them or to effect an 
escape.32 
In United st.a..tes_y...___Qionisio (1973), the supreme 
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court, through Justice Stewart, held that a grand jury sub-
poena ordering the defendant to appear before it and di-
recting him to provide a voice exemplar did not violate his 
Fourth Amendment rights. In a dissenting opinion, Brennan 
agreed with the majority "that no unreasonable seizure of 
the rourth Amendment is effected by a grand jury subpoena 
limited to requiring the appearance of a suspect to testi-
f ,.33 y. He argued, however, that a grand jury subpoena re-
quiring a suspect's appearance for the reason of obtaining 
voice or handwriting exemplars from him was a completely 
different matter. He concluded that "the reasonaoleness 
under the :t·ourth Amendment of such a seizure cannot be 
34 
simply presumed." 
while on routine patrol, a police officer stopped a 
car when he observed that a headlight and its license plate 
light were burned out. Bustamonte was one ot six men in 
the car. 'when, in response to the ot f icer • s request, no 
one could produce any evidence of identification, except 







States v.._Dion1:siQ, 93 S.Ct. 764 (1973). 
p. 776. 
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the officer asked them to step out of the car. Upon the 
arrival of two additional officers, the original one asked 
i:t they could search it. Alcala consented; indeed, he of-
fered to help with it. The ofticers found three checks, 
stolen from a car wash, wadded up under the left rear seat. 
On the basis of this and other evidence, Bustamente was 
charged with possession of completed checks with intent to 
defraud. At trial he unsuccessfully moved to have the 
checks suppressed as evidence. In scbneckloth y. Busta-
monte (1973), the supreme court upheld his conviction on 
the ground that consent may De voluntary even though the 
consenter did not know that he had a constitutional right 
to refuse to allow the search. Brennan dissented. He cas-
tigated the Burger court majority's conclusion that the 
prosecution is not required to demonstrate the defendant's 
knowledge of his right to refuse as a prerequisite to es-
tablishing a voluntary consent to the warrantless search of 
his automobile. He declared that its conclusion "is sup-
ported neither by 'linquistics,' nor by 'epistemology,' 
nor, indeed, by 'comrr.onssnse.• 1135 He proclaimed tnat "it 
wholly escapes rr.e how our citizens can meaningfully oe said 
to have waived something as precious as a constitutional 
guarantee without ever being aware of its existence. 1136 
35~hneckloth v. Bustamente, 93 s.ct. 2041 (1973), 
p. 2073. 
361b~, p. 2073. 
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He argued that a third party, in this case Alcala, can not 
waive an individual's constitutional right to be secure 
against an unwarranted search of an automobile. The facts 
that no search warrant was obtained, and that the police 
officers as representatives of the state did not even sug-
gest a probable cause37 to search the vehicle or that the 
search was incident to a valid arrest of the car's occu-
pants only added to his disbelief and shock with the court 
majority's conclusion. In short, he concluded that the 
search was a constitutionally prohibited invasion of pri-
vacy. 
Beginning in 1971, the Burger court's law-and-order 
justices began their assault on the libertarian conception 
ot the 1'ourth J..mendment's exclusionary rule. 38 Brennan 
consistently has criticized this assault as an insult to 
the adjudicatory function, and the institutional integrity 
of the court. Moreover, he has clung to the ~arren court!s 
view, parts of which were painted by opinions authored oy 
him, that the exclusionary rule is a necessary and inherent 
constitutional ingredient of the Fourth 1-'Jnendrnent. He reg-
istered his complaint in both 11.nited States v. Calandra 
37Reflecting his liberalism, Brennan's standard with 
respect to probaole cause is a high one. conversely, Jus-
tices Powell and Rehnquist use a lower standard. 
38
chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens 
:i..L-.Six_JJ.nknown AQfillil--2.f~~ral By~au ot N,ll~ilg, 91 s. 
ct. 1999 (1971), commenced this assault. 
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(1974) and ~ed statea ~eltier (1975). In Calandr~, 
Powell, speaking for the Court, held that a witness sum-
moned to appear and testify before a grand jury may not re-
fuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based 
on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. 
Brennan, in a passionate dissenting opinion, argued that 
the majority's opinion vitiated the exclusionary rule. 39 
"This downgrading of the exclusionary rule to a determina-
tion whether its application furthers deterrence of future 
police misconduct," he wrote, "reflects a startling miscon-
ception ot the historical objective and purposes of the 
rule. 1140 He disagreed wholeheartedly with the Court's as-
39 h h . . h h" . d w et er Brennan is rig t or wrong on t is point e-
pends largely upon what side of the fence one is sitting 
on. It can be argued convincingly, however, that reducing 
the exclusionary rule only to its deterrent role waters 
do-wn the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment to an inexcus-
able level. In short, the Burger court is extracting the 
"teeth out of the guarantee." see Jeffrey .rv1. Bain and 
Michael K. Kelly, "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: Recent oe-
volopments As Viewed Through its Exceptions, 11 University of 
Mi.am.L.k.a~xli~, 31 (spring, 1977), pp. 615-650; ~1ichael 
Billy, Jr., and Gordon A. Rehnborg, Jr., "The rourth Amend-
ment E.xclusionary Rule: Past, Present, No Future, II rl1he 
l:W:l~~n..JJimill.Q!_Law Review, 12 (winter, 1~75), pp. 507-
537; John M. Burkoff, "'.Che Court That Devoured the ~-,ourth 
Amendment: '£he ·rriumph of an Inconsistent E.xclusionary 
Doctrine," Or~n Law~ti~, 58 (1979), pp. 151-1::12; 
Bernard J. Gilday, Jr., "The Exclusionary Rule: Do-wn and 
Almost Out," l'iQxthern isen.:t.Ycky Law Revie-w, 4 (1977), pp. 1-
19; Keith Allan Glover, "'I'he Exlusionary Rule, Standing, 
and :t.xpectation of Privacy For Car Passengers: A confusion 
of Concepts," Ba~lOLl:!.a_w Beyiew, 31 (Spring, 1979) , pp. 
227-241; and Robert s. Iron, "The Burger court: Discord in 
search and seizure," .Yn.!.Yersity of Rich!!lQ.Ild L.QH_~vie~, 8 
(Spring, 1~74), pp. 433-455. 
40 . d lln!.t!i.Q~.k§§....V. Calandra, 94 S.Ct. 613 {1974), 
p. 624. 
~ertion that the exclusionary rule was rr.erely a judically 
created remedy designed to safeguard rourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent ettect. Rather, 
he wrote: 
~he exclusionary rule is 'part and parcel o:t the 
:tourth Arr.endment's limitation upon (governrr.ental) 
encroachment o:t individual privacy,• and 'an es-
sential part of both the l''ourth and r·ourteenth 
Amendments,• that 'gives to the individual no more 
than that which the Constitution guarantees him, 
to the police o:tticers no less than that to which 
honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the 
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in 
the true administration o:t justice.41 
Dissenting in Pelt~, he vehemently objected to the 
court's "slow strangulation" of the exclusionary rule as 
part and parcel of the l'ourth Amendment. He argued that 
the court's new formulation was fraught with uncertainty. 
He wrote: 
An analysis of the Court's unsuccessfully veiled 
reformulation demonstrates that its apparent rush 
to discard 61 years ot constitutional development 
has produced a formula difficult to comprehend 
and, on any understanding ot its meaning, impos-
sible to justify.42 
~8 
furthermore, he protested strongly against the court's add-
ing a new layer of facttinding. Previously, the decision 
to exclude evidence had turned upon whether it was in :tact 
illegally obtained. Justice Kehnquist's decision, however, 
expanded the inquiry to included whether the law enforcement 
41~lan~~. pp. 625-626. 
42 . 1 . 5 ( ) United States v. Pe tier, ~ s.ct. 2313 1~75 I 
,t:). 2325. 
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officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged ¥Jith 
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the 
.Fourth Amendment. Reflecting his earlier interest in court 
reform, he asserted that the court's new formulation in-
valving consideration of the subjective state of mind of 
numerous people only added to the lower courts' already 
overcrowded dockets. 
After an investigation by the state's ~ttorney's 
fraud unit of real estate settlement activities in certain 
t•.aryland counties indicated that one Mdresen, while act-
ing as a settlement attorney, had defrauded the purchaser 
of certain realty (Lot 13T), the investigators obtained 
¥Jarrants to search petitioner's offices. The ¥Jarrants 
listed specified items pertaining to Lot 13T to be seized 
"together with other fruits, instrumentalities, and evi-
dence of crime at this (time) unknown." In the ensuing 
search a number of incriminating documents, including some 
containing statements made by Andresen were seized. In 
.Andresen l!.&._1:.i~.!_gng (1976), the supreme court, through 
Justice Blackmun, implicitly denied Andresen's motion to 
suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the general war-
rants. 43 Claiming that "general warrants are specifically 
43Blackmun concentrated on the defendant's claim to 
the l:iiftn P..mendment privilege against compulsory self-in-
crimination (see pp. 117-118), and did not directly ad-
dress the ~·ourth Amendment one. 
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prohibited by the :t·ourth Amendment, 1144 Brennan dissented. 
He wrote, "the problem to be avoided is 'not that of intru-
sion per se, but of a general exploratory rurrunaging in a 
person's belongings. 1145 He thus declared that the Fourth 
Amendment's end of protecting '"the sanctity of a man's 
home and the privacies of life'" clearly required that "a 
warrant specify with particularity the place to be searched 
th h . b . 46 and e t ings to e seized." He concluded unequivocally 
that the warrants in question were indeed general, and as 
such unconstitutional. 
United Statea ~~.D.§ (1980) originated from the 
use of illegally seized evidence to impeach statements made 
by the defendant on cross-examination. The Court upheld 
the use of such evidence. Brennan dissented. He declared 
that such a use of unlawfully seized evidence violated the 
E'ourth Amendment. He contended that "arriving at the truth 
is a fundamental goal of our legal system. 1147 He argued, 
however, that it was a goal that could not be realized 
through illegal police conduct. He wrote, "the processes 
of our judicial system may not be fueled by the illegali-
44 Andresen v. Maryla.n.Q, 96 s.ct. 2737 (1976) p. 2754. 
45.IP~. p. 2754. 
46Ibi~, p. ·2754. 
47 . t.o!:'>.~ lln._~~~x. Havens, 100 S.Ct. 1912 (1980), 
p. 1920. 
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. h . . ..48 ties of government aut orities. He found the Court's 
treatment of Fourth and Fifth Amendment privileges disturb-
ing. "The court denigrates their unique status as consti-
tutional protectors," he claimed, 11 .by treating (these) 
. ·1 . t. h .. 49 privi eges as mere incen ive sc emes. He charged that 
the court's decision "patently" disregarded its obligation 
and res90nsibility to enforce constitutional guarantees. 
In ~~ork v. BeJ.£.Qn (1981), the supreme court ruled 
that a police officer's warrantless search of an automobile 
immediately subsequent to the driver's custodial arrest was 
reasonable as a contemporaneous incident to the arrest. 
Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, argued that "it has long 
been a fundamental principle of .t'ourth j.Jllendment analysis 
that exceptions to the warrant requirement are to oe nar-
50 
rawly construed." He contended that the rourth Amend-
ment's essential ~urpose carried with it two corollaries: 
First, for a search to be valid under the Eourth 
Amendment, it must be 'strictly tied to and justi-
fied by the circumstances which rendered its ini-
tiation permissible.' ~econd, in determining 
whether to grant an exception to the warrant re-
quirement, Courts should carefully consider the 
facts and circumstances of each search and seizure, 
focusing on the reasons supporting the exception 
rather than on any bright line rule of general 
application.51 
48Ibi~, p. 1920. 
49 . l.Qid., p. 1920. 
SO~ York v~elton, 101 s.ct. 2860 (1981), p. 
2886. 
SlI- 'd 01 ., p. 2866. 
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Against these corollaries,_he concluded that the search in 
the present case was invalid. 
In ~ourth Amendment cases, Brennan balances the indi-
vidual's claim against the proposed governmental interest 
to determine reasonableness ot the search. Valuing the 
protection ot individual privacy and dignity against intru-
sion by the State, he usually has found that the search is 
unreasonable or unwarranted: and, thus, he has decided in 
favor of the individual. over the years, particularly 
since 1~6~, this decision has become increasingly, almost 
automatic. In fact, of the thirteen cases examined, he 
ruled in favor the reasonableness ot the government's 
search only twice. In both Schrnerber and Hg~, he tound 
the searches reasonable because the circumstances sur-
rounding them implicated his excepting criteria of "ensur-
ing the safety of the arresting of ticers and the security 
of the arrest against the suspect's or evidence's escape." 
In other words, both are classified as "Emergency 
Searches. 1152 
52Peter w. Lewis, CriminaLPrQ.£edure: I.bL,S,y..f?~~ 




The :E'ifth Amendment encompasses the double jeopardy 
clause, the compelled self-incrimination clause, the due 
process clause, and the .. taking" clause. 'I1he first three 
deal with criminal procedure. 1 Brennan has exhioited both 
a passionate concern for the rights of persons accused of 
crimes and an absolute intolerance for police misconduct 
in the course of a criminal investigation. :t·or him, it is 
better to let ninety-nine guilty men go free than to con-
vict one innocent man. Daniel M. Berman wrote, "the pos-
sinility of convicting an innocent man (tor Brennan) is tar 
more frightening than the chance that a scrupulous regard 
for the constitutional rights of defendants may result in 
allowing some criminal to escape punishment.lt 2 He does not 
see any gray in the area ot these three ri:tth t-..mendrnent 
guarantees. ·rhus, in cases involving them, he has employ-
ed an absolutist approach. 
1 The due process clause, of course, sweeps more 
broadly than just criminal procedure. It deals also with 
substantive rights. 
2
oaniel ~ •• Berman, "Mr. Justice Brennan: A Prelimi-
nary Appraisal, 11 The catholic Universi!;y_1&,W Review, 7 
(January, 1~58), p. 15. 
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During the anti-communist crusade, one Nrs. Brown, a 
defendant in denaturalization proceedings, was convicted of 
criminal contempt for refusing to answer questions on 
cross-examination of her voluntary testimony about her past 
and present aftiliation with the American communist Party. 
In ~rown,~ United Stat~ {1~58), the Supreme Court held 
that Mrs. Brown could not invoke the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination on cross-examination regarding 
matters made relevant by her direct examination because she 
had taken the stand voluntarily to testify in her own be-
half. In a dissenting opinion, Brennan argued that the 
sentence was "far too drastic" considering the other avail-
able sanctions. He concluded that the trial judge's exclu-
sive reliance upon the criminal contempt power was arbi-
trary in the circumstances, and, therefore violated ~lrs. 
Brown's right to due process of law. 
The issue of double jeopardy arose in Abbate vL 
.unit~ states {195~). The defendants were convicted in a 
Illinois state court of conspiring to destroy property of 
telephone companies. Brennan, speaking for the court, held 
that the subsequent federal prosecution did not violate the 
Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause. Drawing upon a 
huge body of precedent, 3 he concluded that "from the nature 
3 Brennan drew upon this body of precedent, while his 
libertarian warren court Brethen Warren, Black, and Douglas 
did not~ thereby, accounting, in part, for their dissent. 
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of our government, the same act may be an offence against 
the laws of the United states and also of a state, and be 
punishable in both. 114 The dual sovereignty of the American 
government--E·ederal and State-was the decisive factor in 
his decision. Moreover, he suggested that a contrary hold-
ing might jeopardize an important federal interest in situ-
ations in which the federal sanction was far more severe 
than the penalty imposed by the State. 
Throughout his years on the court, Brennan has re-
mained consistent to this view that the double jeopardy 
clause is not applicable in cases involving dual sovereign-
ty. As will be shown in later cases, however, he believes 
that it can be invoked in cases involving successive prose-
cutions in the same state or sovereignty for the same of-
fence. In short, the issue of sovereignty is a dividing 
line for his approach in double jeopardy cases. 
Jencks, a labor-union officer, was charged with 
falsely swearing that he was not, on a specified date, af-
filiated with the communist Party. The Government called 
as its principle witnesses two Party members who were also 
federal agents, and who made reports to the r·ederal Bureau 
of Investigation on Jencks' activities about which they 
testified. At trial, Jencks unsuccessfully moved that the 
Government produce these reports for the judge's inspection 
4Abbate v. United st~, 79 s.ct. 666 (1959), pp. 
669-670. 
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and, if any discrepancy appeared between theffi and the tes-
timony of their authors, that they be turned over to him 
for use in cross-examination. In ~ncks_~nited States 
(1957), the supreme court, through Brennan, held that a 
prior showing of inconsistency was unnecessary and that the 
reports must be given directly to the defendant without any 
prior screening by the judge. He argued that Jencks was 
entitled to a court order directing the government to pro-
duce the reports. He asserted that the adequacy of Jencks' 
defense was contingent on his accessibility to them. In-
deed, he proclaimed that "justice requires no less." 5 
Lerner y_,_~~Y (1958) originated from the state of 
New York's dismissal of an employee of its Transit system 
under a Security Risk Law, on the basis that he had been 
disclosed to be of doubtful trust and reliability by his 
failure to answer a question concerning his present rela-
tionship to the Communist Party. Considering the facts, 
the Court declared that the dismissal was justifiable under 
the Security Risk Law, and was not rendered unconstitution-
al by Lerner's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination. In a dissenting 
opinion, Brennan contended that the court failed to grasp 
the right at stake. His concern arose from "the simultane-
ous public labeling of the employee as disloyal. 116 He 
5~&.1~ Uniteg~~. 77 s.ct. 1077 (1957), p. 
1103. 
6 ~Ji.L.~ case~, 78 s.ct. 1311 (1958), p. 1328. 
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concluded that the dismissal should be reversed, for it 
branded him a disloyal American without due process of law. 
He wrote: 
strict adherence to required legal procedures, 
especially where one's loyalty is being impugned, 
affords the greatest and, in last analysis, the 
ultimate assurance of the inviolability of our 
freedoms as we have heretofore known them in this 
country. Least of all, should they be impaired 
or trenched upon by procedural shortcuts.7 
The anti-communist crusade led to the adoption of an 
assortment of security and loyalty measures by the federal 
government and the states aimed at guarding against the 
danger of an internal Communist conspiracy. One of these 
measures was the Subversive Activities control Act of 1950. 
In the Act, Congress found that "there exists an world com-
munist movement * * * whose purpose it is, by treachery, 
deceit, infiltration. . . , espionage, sabotage, terrorism, 
and any other means deemed necessary, to establish a com-
munist totalitarian dictatorship in the countries through-
out the world. • • " rrhe Act, therefore, required that 
"Communist-action organizations" in the United States regi-
ster with the Attorney General and file membership lists 
and other information, or face heavy criminal penalties. 
It created also the Subversive Activities Control Board and 
authorized it, upon petition by the Attorney General, to 
determine whether a named group is a .. communist-action 
7Ibid., p. 1329. 
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organization" and to order such an organization to regi-
ster in accordance with the Act. conversely, while it re-
quired "Communist-action groups" to register, the sedition 
sections of the smith Act (1940) created a prima facie case 
that membership in the Communist Party was a federal of-
fence. This conflict was presented in both communi§t f~ 
of the_JJni,t§.Q__~~JL.XL_Subversive AKtJJlities Control 
~g (1961) and A1bertson v. sub~.:§ive Activities control 
~.ill:Q (1965). 
11he question posed in the former case was whether the 
registration requirements of the subversive Activities con-
trol Act violated the Eifth Amendment's privilege against 
self-incrimination. Justice Felix !frankfurter, in one of 
the longest opinions of supreme court history, spoke for 
the majority. He held that the public interest in disclo-
sure outweighed the private right of free expression. With 
respect to the 1-ifth Amendment question, he declared that 
compulsory registration did not constitute compelled self-
incrimination, for it required only the Party to register, 
not individual members. Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, 
concluded that it was a prime example of forced self-in-
crimination, and as such violated the 1:·ifth Amendment. He 
wrote, "I believe that the officials cannot be compelled to 
complete, sign and file the registration statement without 
abriqging their privilege against (compulsory) self-incrim-
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nation." 8 "Registration is unique," he wrote, "because of 
the initial burden it puts on the potential defendant to 
come forward and claim the privilege. 119 He further argued 
that by registrating, the officials virtually established 
a prirna facie case against themselves, for by so doing, 
they admitted an element of their possible criminality of 
belonging to the communist Party in violation of the smith 
Act's membership clause. 
The Subversive Activities control Board's order re-
quiring petitioners to register individually their member-
ship in the United states' Communist Party gave birth to 
lb +-a-~ k' f • t 10 A:Y;J§.X~· Brennan, spea ing or an unanimous cour , 
held that the orders requiring Albertson to register were 
inconsistent with the self-incrimination clause. As in 
~muni§t Party, he believed that the risks of incrimina-
tion imposed by the registration orders were obvious. He 
wrote, "such an admission of membership may be used to 
prosecute the registrant under the membership clause of the 
Smith Act. 1111 
8
communis.t__.far.tlL.Q1-t.bg_llnited sta.t.§s y. subve~~ 
~trol Board, 81 s.ct. 1357 (1~61), p. 1464. 
9Ibid., p. 1462. 
lOTh ' ' t ' ~; a+- t ' . d h d . e maJori y in ~mmY~ Rar y JOine t e issent-
ers. The distinction for Stewart, Clark, and Harlan 
(Frankfurter and Whittaker retired in 1962) between the two 
cases was that the former required organizations, not in-
dividuals, to register, while the latter required individ-
uals to do so. 
11~bertson y, ~ersiv~~ivities Control Board, 
86 s.ct. 194 (1g6S), p. 198. 
·I' 
110 
In schmerber (1966), 12 Brennan held also that the 
taking of plaintiff's blood over his protest on advice of 
counsel did not violate his F'ifth Amendment privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination. Indeed, he claimed 
that this action did not even implicate the privilege. He 
argued that history and legal precedent13 limited the priv-
ilege's area of protection to those circumstances involving 
the state's obtaining of evidence "against an accused 
through 'the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from 
his own mouth. 11114 He wrote, "the privilege protects an 
accused only from being compelled to testify against him-
self or otherwise provide the state with evidence ot a tes-
timonial or communicative nature. 1115 Conversely, he argued 
that "compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the 
source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate 
it. 1116 In fact, this distinction between "testimonial or 
communicative evidence" and "real or physical evidence" is 
the basis of his opinion. He concluded that the withdrawl 
of blood and use of the analysis was the latter form of 
evidence, and as such not inadmissible under the self-in-
12 See pp. 90-93. 
13 
warren, Black, Douglas, and E·ortas apparently did 
not afford history and legal precedent the same degree of 
respect as Brennan in this case. 
14 Schmerber, p. 1831. 
15Ibid., P• 1830. 
16Ibid., P• 1830. 
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crimination clause. 
'I'his distinction between types of evidence, moreover, 
is a dividing line tor him in self-incrimination cases. If 
the compelled evidence is "real or physical," he relies 
upon the "shock the conscience" test. Consistent with his 
libertarianisrr., his conscience is shocked rather easily. 
It was not shocked in SchnJ~rbex, however, because the blood 
sample was taken in a hospital by a doctor in accordance 
with humane medical practices. But, one can strongly in-
ter that such would not be the case it the circumstances 
dittered even in the slightest degree. In fact, Brennan 
cautioned in Schmerber that the holding was limited only to 
the tacts at hand. Conversely, he believes that the ~ifth 
Amendment's self-incrimination clause absolutely prohibits 
the compelling ot 11 testin1onial or corr.municative" evidence. 
In the 1~6~ Term, the supreme court, using the "same 
evidence" test, upheld plaintiff's plea vis-a-vis the titth 
J~endment's Double Jeopardy Clause in waller v. 1'lorida 
(1~70) and Ashe v. ~wenson (1~70). Brennan concurred in 
both cases because he objected to the majority's use of 
the "same evidence" test rather than the "same transactionn 
one. In liJ:le.:, a :tlorida municipal court convicted one 
~aller for violating a city ordinance against destruction 
of city property and breach of the peace, and sentenced 
him to six-months in jail. Shortly thereafter, a state 
court tried, convicted, and sentenced him to six-
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years tor grand larceny, a charge concededly based on the 
same evidence as was involved in the municipal case. In 
his concurring opinion, Brennan disposed of the case by 
statin9, consistent with Abbate, that successive prosecu-
tions by one sovereign judicial entity violated the Double 
Jeopardy clause. He believes that municipal and state 
courts are part of one sovereign judicial system. 
Ashe had its origin in the armed robbery by three or 
four men of six poker players in the home of one of the 
victims. After being charged in separate courts with rob-
bery of each of the six players, the defendant was acquit-
ted for robbing one of the players in one court for insut-
ticient evidence. Nonetheless, he still faced five more 
trials tor the robbery of each of the five remaining play-
era. Brennan, in his concurrence, expanded upon his ~ler 
opinion and called tor the adoption of the "same transac-
tion" test over the "same evidence" test. He wrote, "the 
Double Jeopardy Clause requires in prosecution, except in 
limited circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges 
against a defendant that grow out of a single transac-
t . ..17 ion. He contended that the feared abuses of the crirn-
inal process may be most effectively avoided by adopting 
the "same transaction" test. He argued that the test pro-
tected the individual best against the "possible tyranny of 
17 A§be v. swensQ.n, 90 s.ct. 1189 (1970), p. 1199. 
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18 the overzealous prosecutor." Finally, he proclaimed that 
the test 
not only enforces the ancient prohibition 
against vexatious multiple prosecutions embod-
ied in the Double Jeopardy Clause, but responds 
as well to the increasingly widespread recog-
nition that the consolidation in one lawsuit of 
all issues arising out of a single transaction 
or occurrence best promotes justice, economy, and 
convenience.19 
Conversely, he expressed a real uneasiness with respect to 
the "same evidence" test. "The constitutional protection 
against double jeopardy is empty of meaning," he wrote, "if 
the defendant is forced to 'run the gauntlet' as many times 
as there are victims of a single episode. 1120 Relying upon 
the "same transaction" test, he declared that subsequent 
trials for the same offence following the defendant's ac-
quittal placed him in double jeopardy. 
~rn~~ Arizona (1966) 21 stood as the warren 
court's shrine safeguarding criminal suspects against the 
forced disclosure of evidence. Chief Justice Warren de-
clared that the privilege against self-incrimination at-
taches itself at the point an individual is taken into cus-
18T"h;~ ~..S.I p. 1201. 
19Ibid., p. 1199. 
20ibid,, p. 1202. 
21~anda v. Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), 
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tody, and positive safeguards must be employed to protect 
it. 22 According to him, these safeguards included inform-
ing a suspect undergoing interrogation that he had the 
right to remain silent, that anything he might say could 
be. used against him, and that he was entitled to counsel 
during such pretrial interrogation. He overturned the con-
viction of ~iranda, and three others on the ground that the 
safeguards protecting the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion were not met. Brennan joined wholeheartedly in 
warren's majority opinion. Indeed, in an earlier case, he 
wrote: 
(T)he American system of criminal prosecution 
is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and the Eifth 
Amendment privilege (against self-incrimination) 
is its essential mainstay. Governments, state and 
federal, are thus constitutionally compelled to 
establish guilt by evidence independently and free-
ly secured, and not by coercion prove a charge 
against an accused out of his own mouth.23 
In 1~71, however, the Burger court's law-and-order 
Justices began to undermine the authority of the tviiranda 
safeguards. In ~i.:i.§ v. NelL.~ (1971), the Court held 
22This certainly is in line with Leonard Levy's ex-
amination of the origins of the F·ifth Amendment• s self-in-
crimination clause in .Q.l:..i.gins ot._the Fit.th bme~~ (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1968). considering the 
fact that the clause was inserted in the Fifth Amendment, 
not the Sixth, led Levy to argue that the i:·ramers clearly 
intended that the privilege against self-incrimination ex-
tended to all phases of the criminal proceeding, not just 
only to the actual trial. Brennan's conception of the 
privilege's scope is in accord with Levy's argument. 
23 li9llo~~2.9.9.D· 84 s.ct. 1489 (1964), p. 1493. 
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that a pretrial confession obtained without Mixan.d.9 safe-
guards could probably be used to impeach the defendant's 
trial testimony. Brennan, in a passionate and angry dis-
senting opinion, declared that the court's decision was 
"monstrous," for it went "far toward undoing much of the 
progress made in conforming police methods to the Constitu-
tion. 1124 He argued that "the essential mainstay of (our 
adversary) system is the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. "25 He concluded that the court's opinion threatened 
to undercut it, thereby threatening the integrity of the 
entire system. 
CalifQ.l.Dia._y, Byers (1971) grew out of the defen-
dant's prosecution for refusing to comply with a California 
statute which required those involved in an automobile ac-
cident resulting in property damage to stop and give their 
names and addresses, and which provided no inununity from 
use in subsequent criminal prosecutions of information ob-
tained by the state as a consequence of compliance with the 
statute. The Supreme court ruled that the statute did not 
violate individual's privilege against compulsory self-in-
crimination, Brennan dissented. He argued that "the stat-
ute requires an individual to admit that he has engaged in 
conduct likely to be the subject of criminal punishment 
24U.:::i....-...-' k ~.1_s __ v_.-s.1N~e~w-..:YQXJS, 91 S,Ct. 643 (1971), p. 649. 
25Ibid., p. 649. 
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under the California traffic law. 1126 l:.choing the Califor-
nia supreme court's decision, he contended that the re-
quirement may be enforced consistent with the privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination, only if those re-
porting their involvement were made immune from prosecution 
of of fence related to accident. 
In ,fRul v. Dayis (1976), the court held that a flyer 
which was distributed among merchants by the police con-
taining Paul's name and photograph captioned "Active 
Shoplifters" did not violate his right to due process of 
law. Brennan, in a vehemently worded dissent, declared 
that the flyer clearly violated the Fifth Amendment's due 
process clause. He wrote: 
I have always thought that one of this court's 
most important roles is to provide a bulwark 
against governmental violations of the consti-
tutional safeguards securing in our free society 
the legitimate expectations of every person to 
innate human dignity and sense of worth.27 
He charged that the majority's opinion constituted a "re-
gretable" abdication of this role, and "a saddening deni-
gration of our majestic Bill of Rights. 1128 He contended 
that it validated the imposition by the police on Paul of 
"the stigmatizing label of 'criminal' without the salutary 
and constitutionally mandated safeguards of a criminal 
26
califQlalia y, Byers, ~1 s.ct. 1535 (1971), p. 1563. 
27p l . 
au y. navi§, 96 s.ct. 1155 (1976), p. 1177. 
281121Q~, p. 1177. 
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trial. 1129 .. Certainly the enjoyment of one's good name and 
reputation," he proclaimed, was "among the most cherished 
of rights enjoyed by a free people. 1130 ~1oreover, he claim-
ed that the Court's decision undermined the presumption of 
innocence. 
During the 1975 Term, the supreme court considered 
the issue of self-incrimination and the compelled produc-
tion of business papers in the separate cases of .[.!sher v. 
f.iJlb~, the Government commenced enforcement actions in two 
cases to compel production of accountants' documents in 
possession of taxpayers' attorneys. In eacn 01: these cases 
taxpayers, who were under investigation for possible civil 
or criminal liability under the federal income tax laws, 
after having obtained from their respective accountants 
certain documents relating to the accountants' preparation 
of their tax returns, transfered the documents to their re-
spective attorneys to assist the taxpayers in connection 
with the investigation. subsequently, the Internal Revenue 
service served summonses on the attorney's directing them 
to produce the documents, but the attorneys refused to com-
ply on the ground that the documents served to self-incrim-
inate their respective clients. 'I1he Supreme Court held 
that the compelled production of the documents did not vio-
29Ibid., p. 1168. 
JOibid,, p. 1171. 
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late the self-incrimination clause, for taxpayers have no 
Fifth Amendment privilege to withhold such documents. 
Brennan wrote a concurring opinion because the majority 
neglected to stress the fact that the accountants' docu-
ments in question were not private papers or effects. He 
joined nonetheless in the result. He asserted that "the 
protection of personal privacy is a central purpose of the 
privilege (against self-incrimination)." 31 He contended 
that the historically recognized zone of privacy protected 
by the Fifth J.\mendment extended to all personal papers and 
effects. He stated that business records, except those of 
sole proprietors and practitioners, 32 generally fall out-
side that zone of privacy. Considering the facts that the 
accountants• work papers in question did not relate to the 
preparation of their personal tax returns, and that the 
papers were wholly business in nature (i.e., pursuant to 
the selling of their public services), Brennan concluded 
that they were public, not private papers and effects. 
Thus, he held that they fell outside the Fifth Amendment's 
zone of privacy. 
On the other hand, &idresen involved the business 
papers of a sole proprietor and practitioner. 33 The Court, 
31Fisher y. United States, 96 S.Ct. 1569 (1976), p. 
1583. 
32
ae cited the fact that the court previously had 
recognized that the self-incrimination privilege extended 
to this category of business papers. 
33
see p. 99 for facts of case. 
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nonetheless, held that the introduction at trail of peti-
tioner's personal business documents, including some con-
taining statements made by him, did not violate his privi-
lege against self-incrimination. without any hesitation, 
Brennan dissented. ~ocusing on the exception expressed in 
t.i.§.b~, he claimed that personal business papers (i.e., 
those of a sole proprietor and practitioner) fell inside 
the Fifth Amendment's zone of privacy. He thus held that 
the introduction of such papers, as in the present case, 
clearly violated the self-incrimination clause. 
Speaking for the Court in United S.t.,a:t.~. Martin 
~n_~Jilly comp~ (1977), Brennan proclaimed that the 
double jeopardy clause barred an appeal by the Government 
of the United states of a judgment of acquittal following 
the discharge of a jury which had been unable to agree on 
a verdict in a criminal contempt trial. since congress had 
removed the statutory limitations to appeal, he claimed the 
relevant inquiry turns on the reach of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. Indeed, he wrote, "it has become 'necessary to 
take a closer look at the policies underlying the clause in 
order to determine more precisely the boundaries of the 
Government's appeal rights in criminal cases. 113~ He argued 
that the DOuble Jeopardy Clause 
3 ~l.lnited_States v. Martin Linen_~upply Company, ~7 s. 
ct. 1349 (1977), p. 1353. 
guarantees that the State shall not be permit-
ted to make repeated attempts to convict the ac-
cused 'thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in 
a continuous state of anxiety and insecurity.35 
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The protections afforded by the Clause, he contended, do 
not come into play unless the accused has been placed in 
jeopardy. "This state of jeopardy attaches," he wrote, 
"when the jury is empaneled and sworn, or, in a bench trial 
when the judge begins to receive evidence." 36 He concluded 
that the state of jeopardy had been attached when the jury 
was empaneled. 
In United states y, DiFrancesco (1980), the court 
ruled that the United states may appeal. a sentence imposed 
by a federal district judge on the ground that it was too 
lenient. In a dissenting.opinion, Brennan declared that 
the United states may not appeal the sentence, for it vio-
lated the double jeopardy clause. He adhered to one view 
that the United states may not appeal an acquittal. That 
the Court showed no basis for differentiating between the 
finality of acquittals and the finality of sentences rated 
heavily in his decision._ .Moreover, he warned against 
allowing the government to enhance a sentence because he 
believed that it opened the door to the government appeal 
of acquittals. 
35Ib~, p. 1353. 
36Ibid~, p. 1354. 
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Brennan's rifth Amendment decisions with respect to 
the double jeopardy, the compelled self-incrimination, and 
due process clauses reflect his determination to safeguard 
the rights o:f: the accused. Unlike in E·irst and fourth 
Amendment cases, Brennan does not employ a balancing test 
in r if th j;Inendment cases. Rather, he has employed an ab-
solutist approach. He believes that there are no legiti-
mate governmental reasons for circumventing the privileges 
secured by the :tifth .Amendment. Eor him, consistent with 
his libertarianism, the parameters of the privileges se-
cured by the Fifth ~~endrnent are wide. The critical ques-
tion for his approach is whether the privilege attaches. 
In Schme~ber and Fis~, he held that the compulsory draw-
ing of a man's blood, who had been involved in an auto-
mobile accident, for purposes of determining his blood-
alcohol-content, and the compelled production ot papers ot 
a wholly business nature did not implicate the privilege 
against self-incrimination. In Abba~, he declared that 
the successive prosecutions for the same offence in dif-
ferent sovereignties did not implicate the double jeopardy 
clause. In the vast majority of cases, however, he has 
ruled that the privilege attaches. In all these cases, he 




A fair trial encompasses the individual's right to 
confront the witnesses against him, the right to the aid or 
presence of counsel, the right to proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and the less fundamental right to present one's case 
betore an impartial jury for judgment. 1 While many pay 
"lip service" to it, Brennan has adhered vigorously to the 
view that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty. In-
deed, his sixth Amendment approach retlects this adherence. 
for Brennan, the individual's rights to confront the wit-
nesses against him and to proof beyond a reasonable douot 
are unconditional. The individual's right to the aid of 
counsel, on the other hand, is conditional upon whether the 
incident in question is a critical stage of the prosecu-
tion. He has joined in expanding the parameters of what 
constitutes a critical stage. i:L'hus, in cases implicating 
the Confrontation Clause, or the proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt clause, or the right to counsel's assistance at a 
critical stage of prosecution, Brennan has employed an ab-
1Brennan believes that this right is less fundamental 
in comparison with the other three. That he feels this way 




speaking for the Court in ~las v. l\labama (1965), 
Brennan contended that the right to cross-examination was a 
primary interest secured by the sixth Amendment's Confron-
tation Clause. He argued that this secured right may not 
be realized unless an accused is afforded an adequate op-
portunity for cross-examination. He claimed that the 
Solicitor's reading of a state witness' statement contain-
ing alleged confession to the crimes allegedly perpetrated 
by him and DOuglas was "the equivalent in the jury's mind 
of testirnony. 112 He thus concluded that the witness, one 
Loyd, could not invoke the l:ifth Amendment privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination in order to shield 
himself from cross-examination by the accused. According 
to Brennan, the Fifth P.mendment right was surrendered when 
the individual voluntarily testified against Douglas. 3 
In 1966, the Warren court erected the skeletal frame-
work of the Miranda rule. 4 The following year, through 
Brennan, it fleshed out some of this skeleton in the cases 
20ouglas v. tiabama, 85 s.ct. 1074 (1965), p. 1077. 
3This does not deviate from Brennan's dissenting 
opinion in Brown y. United stat§.§ (see page 104). In that 
case, he denied the plaintiff's self-incrimination claim, 
but declared conversely that the judge's arbitrary use of 
the contempt power violated her right to due process of 
law. 
4~a......x..__Arizona, see pages 113-114· Relevant to 
the Sixth Amendment, Chief Justice warren declared that its 
right to the aid or presence of counsel extended to all 
critical stages of prosecution. 
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of l.ln!ted states v. w.Ad§ (1967) and Gilbe,,t._:£.a..._Cali,fornia 
(1967) by extending the contours of "critical stage." At 
issue in ~ was whether the courtroom identification of 
an accused at trial is to be excluded f rorn evidence because 
the accused was exhibited to the witnesses betore trial at 
a post-indictment lineup conducted for identification pur-
poses without notice and in the absence of the accused's 
appointed counsel, Brennan held that wade was entitled to 
the aid of counsel during such a proceeding, for it was a 
critical stage of prosecution. He argued that the Sixth 
Amendment guaranteed that an accused will not have to 
"stand alone against the state at any stage of the prosecu-
tion, formal or informal, in court or not, where counsel's 
absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair 
trial. 115 He contended that a post-indictment lineup for 
the purposes of eliciting identification evidence was 
"peculiarly riddled with innumberable dangers and variable 
factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate 
from a fair trial." 6 Foremost, he expressed a real concern 
with the hazard of mistaken identity. He wrote, "the vaga-
ries of eyewitness identification are well-known: the an-
nals of criminal law are rife with instances o:t mistaken 
identification. 117 He asserted that counsel was necessary 
5
united statiUl_v. wage, 87 s.ct. 1926 (1967) p. 1932. 
6~..LI P• 1933. 
71bid., p. 1~33. 
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in order to safeguard against prejudice. Indeed, he said 
that the adequacy of Wade's defense was contingent upon 
it. "The accused's inability effectively to reconstruct at 
trial any unfairness that occurred at the lineup," he 
wrote, "may deprive him of his only opportunity to meaning-
fully attack the credibility of the witness' courtroom 
identification. 118 'llhus, he concluded that the defendant 
must be afforded counsel at such a proceeding in order to 
ensure that he will have a fair trial. 
In Gilbert, state witnesses identified defendant in 
the courtroom, and testif-ied, in substance, to their prior 
identification of him in a lineup conducted on a Los Ange-
les• auditorium stage behind-bright lights which prevented 
those in the lineup from seeing the audience, without no-
tice to Gilbert's appointed counsel, sixteen days after his 
indictment for armed robbery. In addition, the defendant 
was required to take a handwriting exemplar in absence of 
counsel. Gilbert unsuccessfully moved to have the testi-
mony and the exemplar excluded from court consideration on 
the grounds that they were obtained in violation of his 
right to counsel. On review, Brennan denied his motion 
concerning the exemplar, but sustained it regarding the 
testimony. He argued that the taking of the exemplar was 
81b~, p. 1933. 
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h . 9 not a critical stage of t e prosecution. Moreover, he 
claimed that if an unrepresentative exemplar were taken it 
could be corrected at trial. He contended that Gibert had 
the opportunity for a meaningtul confrontation 
of the state's case at trial through the ordi-
nary processes of cross-examination of the State's 
expert handwriting witness and the presentin~ of 
the evidence of his own handwriting experts. 0 
On the other hand, relying upon ~. he declared that the 
lineup, without notification to appointed counsel, violated 
the Sixth Amendment, for it was a critical stage. Thus, he 
concluded that the witnesses' in-court identifications were 
tainted, and as such must be excluded. Indeed, he called 
for the adoption of a per se exclusionary rule. He wrote, 
"only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can 
be an effective sanction to ensure that law enforcement au-
thorities will respect the accused's constitutional right 
t th f h . l h . . l l' t 11 o e presence o is counse at t e critica ine-up. ' 
The question presented in In re winshi~ {1~70) was 
whether juveniles, in this case twelve-year old Samuel 
winship, are entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
9 In Dionisio {see page 94), he declared, however, 
that a grand jury subpoena requiring a suspect's appearance 
for the reason ot taking voice or handwriting exemplars 
violated the Fourth Amendment. 




when charged with a criminal offence. Brennan, speaking 
for the court, declared that they were entitled to the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He contended 
that the standard played "a critical role in the American 
scheme of criminal procedure," for it was "a prime instru-
ment for reducing the risk of convictions resting on f ac-
tual error. 1113 He wrote: 
the standard provides concrete substance tor 
the presumption of innocence--the bedrock 'axio-
matic and elementary' principle whose 'enforce-
ment lies at the foundation of the administra-
tion of our criminal law.•14 
E·inally, he claimed that the use of the standard was criti-
cal for cogent reasons. ..A society that values the good 
name and freedom ot every individual should not," he wrote, 
"condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is rea-
sonable doubt about his guilt. 1115 t-1oreover, he wrote, it 
was "indispensable to command the respect and confidence of 
the community in applications of the criminal law. 1116 
At Green's trial, one Melvin Porter, called to testi-
fy for the state, claimed that he was unable to recall the 
121l'he defendant was found guilty, despite some doubt, 
ot juvenile delinquency in New York ramily Court for break-
ing into a locker and stealing $112 from a women's purse. 
Of importance, the court applied New York's delinquency 
standard of a preponderance of evidence. 
131n re winshi.Q, 90 s.ct. 1068 {1970), p. 1072. 
14Ibid., p. 1072. 
15IoiQ.s., p. 1072. 
16Ib'd 1 e I p. 1072. 
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facts surrounding his purchase of marijuana from said de-
f endant because he was under the influence of LSD at the 
time. Upon the judge's consent, the prosecution introduced 
Porter's preliminary hearing testimony in which he identi-
fied Green as his supplier. In ~fornia v. ~een (1970), 
the supreme Court ruled that the introduction of such evi-
dence did not violate the sixth Amendment's Confrontation 
Clause. Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, declared that it 
did, for it violated his "Sixth Amendment right to grapple 
ff . l . h . . . t. . d 1117 e ective y wit incrimina ing evi ence. He argued that 
there was "no significant diff·erence between a witness who 
fails to testify about an alleged offence because he is un-
willing to do so and a witness whose silence is compelled 
by an inability to remember. 1118 He claimed that the re-
maining question was whether a pretrial statement obtained 
at a preliminary hearing under oath and subject to cross-
examination met the purposes of the confrontation clause at 
trial. He declared that it did not. He argued that "cross 
examination at the preliminary hearing pales beside that 
h . h tak l . l 19 w ic es pace at tria ." Indeed, he wrote, "it ig-
nores reality to assume the purposes of the confrontation 
Clause are met during preliminary hearing. 1120 Moreover, 
l?~alifox.ni.A v. Green, 90 S.Ct. 1930 (1970), p. 1956. 
181.Qig., p. 1~54. 
19J;bid., p. 1955. 
201hig1, p. 1956. 
129 
he found that the witness' lapse of memory cast serious 
doubt upon the reliability of his preliminary hearing tes-
timony. He concluded that this unreliability, coupled with 
the impossibility of its cross-examination at trial, denied 
the accused his sixth Amendment rights. 
A police station showup for purposes of identif ica-
tion, without the presence of counsel, that took place sub-
sequent to Kirby's and a companion's arrest, but before 
they had been indicted or otherwise formally charged with 
robbing one willie Shard of his traveler's checks and so-
cial security card gave birth to Kirby v. Illinois (1972). 
The court held that the testimony at trial pertaining to 
showup identification was admissible oecause the police 
station showup was not a "criminal prosecution" at which 
Kirby possessed a constitutional privilege to the aid of 
counsel. In a dissenting opinion, Brennan, citing ~. 
contended that the Burger Court law-and-order majority's 
opinion deviated from precedent. 21 He argued that since 
the police station showup was a critical stage of prosecu-
tion, Kirby was entitled to the presence of counsel. As in 
~. he asserted that the showup, like the lineup, "was 
particularly fraught with the peril of mistaken identifi-
cation. 1122 He wrote: 
21
·rhis reflects his respect for precedent. ~. of 
course, emanated from his pen, nonetheless, it was prece-
dent. 
22Kirby v. Ill,i112i§, 92 s.ct. 1877 (1972), p. 1887. 
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In the setting of a police station squad room 
where all present except the petitioner and Bean 
(Kirby's companion) were police officers, the dan-
ger was quite real that Shard's understandable re-
sentment might lead him too readily to agree with 
the police that the pair under arrest, and the 
only persons exhibited to him, were indeed the 
roobers.23 
In Scott v. Illi.D~ (1~79), the supreme court held 
that the ~ixth and Fourteenth t-:..mendments only require that 
an indigent criminal defendant, in this case one Scott, who 
was charged with the offence of .. theft," be afforded the 
right to appointed counsel if he is sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment. on a broader scale, this holding reflected 
the Burger court law-and-order majority's assault on the 
warren court's libertarian view of the indigent's right to 
counsel. For this precise reason, Brennan filed a dissent-
ing opinion. He proclaimed that the "plain wording of the 
sixth Amendment and the court's precedents compel the con-
clusion that Scott's uncounseled conviction violated the 
sixth Amendment. 1124 He argued that the court's opinion re-
stricted "the right to counsel, perhaps the most funda-
mental sixth Amendment right, more narrowly than the ad-
'tt dl l f d t l · ht t · t · l 1125 mi e y ess un arr.en a rig o a Jury ria • His 
24
scott y. I1linois, 99 S.Ct. 1158 (197~), p. 1163. 
These precedents included ~£§jnge.L_v. H~m~jn, 92 S.Ct. 
200~ (1~72) in which the Court, through Douglas, held that 
'.' abs~nt knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be 
imprisoned for any offence, whether classified as petty, 
misdemeanor or felony, unless he was represented by coun-
sel at trial." 
25 IbidL, p. 1170. 
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decision turned on the possible sentence, rather than the 
actual one. The fact that the offence of "theft" with 
which Scott was charged was punishable by a sentence of up 
to one year in jail played a pivotal role in his decision. 
l'-1ore importantly, he contended that conviction for theft 
carried "the moral stigma associated with common-law crimes 
traditionally recognized as indicative of moral depravi-
ty. 1126 Consequently, he declared that Scott must oe af-
forded the aid of counsel. 
Brennan believes that the individual's right to a 
jury trial is fundamental, albeit less so than the other 
Sixth Amendment guarantees. His view is reflected in a 
number of cases. He joined in Justice White's majority 
opinion in Duncan v. Louisi.an.g (1968). The case grew out 
of the denial of Duncan's request for a jury trial oy the 
state Of Louisiana on the ground that its Constitution 
granted jury trials only in capital cases or in cases of 
imprisonment at hard labor. Duncan, a black youth, was 
charged, convicted, and sentenced to sixty days imprison-
ment and a $150 fine for the misdemeanor of simple battery 
in connection with his slapping of a white youth. white 
declared that trial by jury in criminal cases is f undamen-
tal to the American scheme of justice. Thus, he concluded 
that the state of Louisiana was required to afford the ac-
cused a jury trial in criminal prosecutions~ and as such 
26 . I.oid. , p. 1165. 
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Duncan's request was justifiable. 
In Jobn§QD~Louisiana (1972), one ~rank Johnson was 
tried in a Louisiana court by a twelve-person jury and con-
victed for armed robbery by a 9-3 verdict as authorized by 
Louisiana law in cases where the crime is necessarily pun-
ishable by hard labor. 'I'he Burger court upheld the verdict 
on the ground that state provisions allowing less-than-
unanimous jury verdicts in certain criminal cases was con-
stitutional. In a dissenting opinion, Brennan held, on 
the other hand, that such provisions were unconstitutional 
on Sixth and J:ourteenth J..mendment grounds. He claimed that 
emotions often run high at criminal trials. Thus, he called 
for an unanimous verdict as a means of counterbalancing 
the negative effect of these emotions upon the open-mind-
edness of jurors and their ability to fairly weigh the ar-
guments opposing their predisposed position. He wrote: 
~hen verdicts must be unanimous, no member of 
the jury may be ignored by the others. when less 
than unanimity is sufficient, consideration ot 
minority views may become nothing more than a mat-
ter of majority grace. In my opinion, the right 
of all groups in this Nation to participate in the 
criminal process means the right to have their 
voices heard. A unanimous verdict vindicates that 
right. Najority verdicts could destroy it.27 
In Nurphy v. Florida (1975), he dissented from the 
court's decision that the petitioner was not denied a fair 
27It . . t. b . . h h is interes ing, ut not surprising, t at e sees 
the need for unanimous verdicts through the perspective of 
free expression and the furtherance of the citizenry's 
democratic "self-governing powers." 
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trial for the charge of breaking into a house, armed with 
intent to rob, because members of the jury had learned 
from news accounts about a prior felony conviction for his 
involvement in the 1964 theft of the star of India sapphire 
from a museum in New York, or certain facts about the crime 
with which he was charged. citing the jurors' testimony 
about the effects of these accounts, Brennan claimed "that 
the taint of widespread publicity regarding his criminal 
background * * * infected the jury's deliberations is ap-
parent. "28 He criticized the trial judge for failing to 
take the necessary steps both to insulate prospective jur-
ors from media coverage of the prior case and to prevent 
pretrial discussion of the present case among them. He 
wrote, "the trial court made no attempt to prevent discus-
sion of the case or petitioner's previous criminal ex-
plaits among the prospective jurors, and one juror freely 
dm ' d h h . . . . 29 a itte t at e was predisposed to convict petitioner." 
He thus concluded that the petitioner's right to a tair 
trial was violated. 
For Brennan, a fair trial encompasses the accused's 
rights to counsel, to confront the witnesses against him, 
to an impartial jury, and to the use of the standard of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He believes that an ac-
28MurJ.1b~~orida, 95 s.ct. 2031 (1975), p. 2038. 
29Ibid., p. 2038. 
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cused is entitled to the aid of counsel at all critical 
stages of prosecution. ·rhus, his approach in the area of 
this right has turned on his determination ot whether an 
occurrence is a critical stage. In his decisions, he has 
declared that a post-indictment line-up, a pre-indictment 
police station showup for purposes of identification, and 
the trial itself constitute such a stage. conversely, he 
has proclaimed that the taking of a handwriting exemplar 
was not a critical stage. He believes that the accused's 
opportunity to cross-examine or confront the witnesses 
against him at trial is an essential interest secured by 
the sixth Amendment's confrontation Clause. He has ruled 
that the introduction as evidence at trial ot a witness' 
~re-trial statement, when the witness is unwilling or un-
able to take the stand violates the accused's right to con-
front him. In short, his approach in sixth Amendment 
cases, when the right attaches, is an absolute one. 
In the area ot criminal procedure, rlrennan has shown 
a deep commitment to the protection of the individual's 
lioerties against unwarranted and illegal governmental in-
trusions. Over the years, this commitment has necome in-
creasingly absolute. Three probable tactors underly this 
movement: (1) his continual interest in more enlightened 
criminal and trial procedures: (2) the change of guard from 
the warren court to the Burger court: and (3) to a lesser 
degree, perhaps the oreakdown of ethical consensus. 
CHAPTER X 
:CIGHTH A.MEND~iENT 
'!'he Eighth lJnendment protects the individual against 
the requirement of excessive bail, the imposition of exces-
sive fines, and the infliction of cruel and unusual punish-
ments. Brennan's highth .Amendment decisions primarily have 
addressed the issue of cruel and unusual punishments. He 
believes that any punishment that derogates trom human dig-
nity is cruel and unusual. He has employed "the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society" test to determine whether a particular punishment 
is a derogation thereof. Relying on this standard, he un-
equivocally and without deviation has condemned the use of 
the death penalty. The critical underlying aspects of his 
standard, consistent with his liberalism and Christian 
faith, is a concern for human dignity, and the fact that 
he seems to hold hope for the retormation of even the most 
hardened and sadistic of criminals. In addition, the 
breakdown of ethical consensus may have a tenuous intluence 
upon him in this area. Despite the fact that most of the 
states have reinstituted its use, many people and groups 
still believe strongly that the death penalty is morally 
wrong, including the Catholic Church. The degree of this 
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influence is deoatable, but one thing is certain, Brennan 
agrees with them. 
The issue of the death penalty vis-a-vis the £ighth 
Aif.end~ent's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause has been, 
and still is, one of the most controversial and problematic 
for the Burger court. Iwiany _t)eople, including the majority 
1 l' " . ot Brennan's Brethen on the Burger court, be ieve tnat in 
certain circumstances the imposition of the death penalty 
is justitiaole. Brennan simply does not agree with this 
beliet, and has protested vociferously aga~nst its use, no 
matter the circumstances. His view is reflected in numer-
ous cases, including ~man v. Georgi.Q (1972), Gr§SJg_X.... 
~g.i~ (1976), and Coker y. Geo~ (1~77). 
In f.Y.r!r~n. 2 the court held that the irn~sition of the 
death penalty where statute failed to provide safeguards 
against arbitrary and capricious administration was cruel 
and unusual. Brennan filed a concurring opinion because, 
unlike the majority, he did not want to leave the door 
ajar, even slightly, tor the use of the death penalty. He 
declared that its imposition, regardless of the crime, vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
1This majority excludes Justice Thurgood ~arshall who 
like Brennan, believes that the penalty is absolutely pro-
hibited by the l:.ighth Amendment. 
2The Supreme Court for the first time ruled on the 
constitutionality of the penalty under the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause. 
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Clause. Examining the history of the clause, he asserted 
that the Framers included it to restrict the legislative 
branch's power so that it would not have "the unfettered 
power to prescribe punishments for crimes." 3 He claimed, 
therefore, that the courts must determine the constitution-
al validity of punishment. Beyond that, however, he con-
ceded that their intent was imprecise. He wrote, "we can-
not know exactly what the E'ramers thought 'cruel and un-
usual punishments' were. 114 He stated that the court "must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society. 05 Applying 
these standards, he asserted that the Clause prohibited 
"the infliction of uncivilized and unhumane punishments" 
that did not "comport with human dignity. 116 He declared 
that ••death was truly an awesome punishment" which by its 
nature involved "a denial of the executed person's human-
ity.117 Moreover, he concluded that the death penalty "in 
comparison to all other punishments * * * is uniquely de-
grading to human dignity. 08 He proposed a test for deter-
mining whether a punishment violated the Clause. He wrote: 
3 v.~xgi_a, 92 s.ct. 2736 (1972), ~an p. 2739. 
4 J;bid11 p. 2739. 
5 1~ig., p .. 2742. 
6 ll2i.s;l.L I p. 2742. 
7Ibid..t., p. 2752. 
81bid ... , P• 2753. 
The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative 
one: If a punishment is unusually severe, if 
there is a strong probability that it is inflict-
ed arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected 
by contemporary society, and if there is no rea-
son to believe that it serves any penal purpose 
more effectively than some less severe punishment, 
then the continued infliction of that punishment 
violates the command of the Clause.9 
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Judged against this cumulative test, he concluded that the 
death penalty was absolutely inconsistent with the clause. 
In Gregg, the Court, concluding that capital punish-
ment may serve the essential function of expressing so-
ciety's moral outrage, declared that the imposition of the 
death penalty was not cruel and unusual where statute pro-
vided guidelines for mitigating factors and sentence is not 
automatic. Reaffirming his adherence to an absolute ~ro-
hibition of the death penalty's use, Brennan dissented. He 
attacked the majority's opinion for requiring that "evolv-
ing standards of decency focus primarily upon the proce-
dures employed by the State to single out persons to suffer 
the penalty of death." 10 Instead, he asserted that these 
standards must focus on the essence of the death penalty. 
He concluded that 
'moral concepts' require us to hold that the law 
has progressed to the point where we should declare 
that the punishments of death, like punishments on 
the rack, the screw, and the wheel, is no longer 
morally tolerable in our civilized society.11 
9 Ibid., p. 2748. 
10 ~egg v. Georgia, 96 s.ct. 2909 {1976), p. 2971. 
11
.l.!2ia..t.., P• 2972. 
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Ehrlich Anthony Coker, while serving sentences for 
murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault, escaped 
from prison. For his conduct during the single day of es-
cape, he was convicted of escape, motor vehicle theft, 
armed robbery, kidnapping, and rape, the last three which 
were capital crimes in Georgia, and sentenced to the death 
penalty. Considering the fact that he had not murdered 
anyone during the spree, the court held that the sentence 
was forbidden by the Eighth Amendment because it was gross-
ly disproportionate and excessive vis-a-vis the crimes. 
Brennan, in a concurring opinion, clung to his view that 
the death penalty, regardless of the circumstances, con-
stituted a cruel and unusual punishment. He thus called 
for the setting aside of the imposed sentence. 
The death penalty is not substantially rejected by 
contemporary society. The fact that 38 out of 50 states 
have restored it bears this out. Nonetheless, Brennan con-
tinues to persist in his absolute disapproval of its use. 
His disapproval is based on his belief that our society has 
advanced beyond the "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth" judicial mentality. Moreover, he believes that it 
is unusually severe, and that there is not reason to be-
lieve that it serves any penal purpose--retributive and/or 
deterrence---more effectively than some less severe punish-
ment, such as life imprisonment. Remember that his pro-
posed test for determining whether a punishment is cruel 
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and unusual is a cumulative one. That is, in order for a 
punishment to pass muster, it must meet all the criteria. 
He correctly surmises that the death penalty does not. In 
short, his visceral instinct tells him that it is wrong, 
and he finds substantiation for it in history and the lan-
guage of the Eighth Amendment. 
In the past decade, the national media has given wide 
coverage to the issue of the United states' overcrowded 
prisons. In fact, this issue was brought to the courts 
numerous times in case form for remedy. One of these cases 
was Rhodes y. Chaggian {1981), The supreme Court held that 
prison overcrowding and double-celling such as existed at 
the southern Ohio correctional Facility did not constitute 
cruel and unusual confinement. In a concurring opinion, 
Brennan claimed that the courts had the responsibility to 
scrutinize such claims. He argued that "the courts have 
emerged as a critical force behind efforts to ameloriate 
inhumane conditions. 1112 Indeed, he contended that the 
courts were peculiarly invested with the ability and oppor-
tunity to do so. He wrote: 
Insulated as they are from political pressures, 
and charged with the duty of enforcing the con-
stitution, courts are in the strongest position 
to insist that unconstitutional conditions be 
remedied, even at significant financial cost.13 
12Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1~81), P• 2405. 
13Ibid., p. 2405. 
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He claimed that the task involved determining whether the 
challenged conditions of confinement comported with human 
dignity. considering the findings of fact, he concluded 
that the conditions, examined in their totality, did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment, for they did not derQ-gate 
from human dignity. 
In sum, Brennan's Eighth Amendment decisions have ad-
dressed almost exclusively the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause. with respect to capital punishment, he is an ab-
solutist. That is, he has erected an absolute ban against 
its use. He believes that it denies the executed individ-
ual his humanity and, as such deviates from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a civilized 
society. Moreover, his faith in the reformation of the 
criminal, and respect for human dignity, are implicit in 
his capital punishment decisions. The breakdown of ethical 
consensus is also implicit, but to a much lesser degree. 
His absolutism, however, does not extend to other cruel and 
unusual punishment claims. In this area, he pays strict 
attention to the facts presented in each case. He does 
this in order to determine whether the punishment derogates 
from the individual's human dignity. Indeed, his decision 
turns on this determination. Finally, he believes that it 
is the courts' constitutional duty to consider such matters 
and, considering the fact that they are relatively immune 
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from political pressures, that courts are in the best posi-
tion to do so. 14 
14see Richard Neely, How Courts Govell}...America, (New 
Haven.and London: Yale University Press, 1981), for an 
interesting and cogent argument along these lines. 
CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSION 
Justice :Felix Frankfurter once said that he had al-
ways taught his law students at Harvard to think for them-
selves. He claimed, however, that one of his former 
students, Justice william J. Brennan, Jr., went too far. 
Questioned as to how he felt about this statement, Brennan 
"thought a moment and said he would let the written words 
of his opinions tell their own story. 111 
In his Bill of Rights opinions, Brennan clearly has 
revealed himself as a civil libertarian. He believes that 
the Bill of Rights was intended by its Framers to prevent 
government oppression of individual rights. He consequent-
ly has shown a strong predilection for the protection of 
individual liberty against governmental intrusions. In-
deed, over the years, this predilection in many circum-
stances has become increasingly absolute. 
Two key notions are evidenced in his libertarianism: 
respect for perso~al privacy and human dignity: and demo-
cratic self-government. He views privacy as an intrinsic 
human privilege that the government can not abridge, unless 
1Joseph E'oote, "Mr. Justice Brennan: A Profile," 
liaJ;xgrd Law School~ulletin, 18 (November, 1966), p. 20. 
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the societal need is compelling. Moreover, in many cases, 
he seemingly has ignored the government's proposed rea-
son(s). While the notion of privacy is mirrored in all of 
his Bill of Rights decisions, the notion of democratic 
self-government is reflected primarily in his F·irst Amend-
ment opinions. He considers freedom of expression the most 
precious of the first ten amendments• guarantees, for it 
leads to the increased knowledge and sophistication of the 
electorate. In the event that the two notions come into 
conflict, as in :ri,me. Inc. y. Hill, 2 he has resolved in 
favor of democratic self-government. 
The concept of "ordered liberty," likewise, is crit-
ical to his libertarianism. In fact, it was primarily the 
determining factor for him in Schmer~Y.L Californi~. 3 
He wrote that individual liberty is the basis of American 
democracy. But, as he further wrote, this liberty has its 
limits. In short, "it is a liberty of the individual under 
such restraints as are necessary to preserve the same 
. h 4 rig ts of others." For Brennan, the unrestrained exercise 
of individual liberty leads to chaos or anarchy. In other 
words, it destroys liberty. Thus, a degree of order is im-
perative. He was undoubtedly correct when he said, 11 with-
2~, at pp. 76-78. 
3 
.Mli1 at PP• 90-93, 110-111. 
4 Brennan, "Ordered Liberty," p. 14. 
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out 'order' there is no 'liberty. 1 " 5 Nonetheless, he real-
izes also that too much order suffocates liberty. There-
fore, he calls for just enough order to attain the all-
important desire for individual liberty. In the vast ma-
jority of cases, he has declared that the degree of gov-
ernmentally imposed order was indeed too much. 
During his twenty-six years on the court, Justice 
William J. Brennan, Jr., has played a leading role in 
strengthening and expanding the liberties of the individ-
ual. As Edward v. Heck asserted, he was the cutting edge 
of warren Court liberalism. 6 Moreover, he has continued 
in this role, indeed in more pronounced fashion, as a mem-
ber of the Burger Court. 
5Ibid,, p. 15. 
6 Id., at p. 2. 
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